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LAC Abstract 
Thesis Title: Aboriginal Participation in Canada: Overcoming Alienation and Mistrust in 
a Situation of Complex Interdependence 
Author: Marc Joseph Woons 
This thesis examines the importance of Aboriginal participation in Canadian institutions, why 
Aboriginal peoples are mistrustful of Canadian institutions, and how reforms might encourage 
effective Aboriginal participation within Canadian institutions. The first chapter studies the 
extent of Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal interdependence and its political ramifications. Because 
interdependence is so great, Aboriginal peoples must participate within shared institutions to 
influence important decisions affecting them. The second chapter suggests that encouraging 
Aboriginal participation requires that we overcome strong feelings of alienation and mistrust. In 
considering other theories of shared citizenship, I conclude that this requires solutions that 
address Aboriginal symbolic concerns, promote Aboriginal interests, and avoid calls for a shared 
identity. This leads me to discuss the potential of several reforms in Chapter Three: Aboriginal 
electoral districts, co-management boards, and indigenizing shared institutions. These reforms 
seek to make participation in shared institutions more attractive for those who strongly identify 
as Aboriginal. 
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Introduction 
Aboriginal peoples tend not to prioritize participation in Canadian institutions as a way 
to express themselves or further their interests. This lack of enthusiasm has not always 
been the case. Enfranchisement throughout the 1960s appeared to improve relations 
between many Aboriginal peoples and the wider community.l Studies suggest initial 
Aboriginal participation rates in elections compared favourably with the wider 
community. However, enthusiasm quickly waned.2 Aboriginal electoral experiences 
have proven to be overwhelmingly negative as their participation rarely led to the 
election of Aboriginal representatives or saw legislatures promote their interests. The 
first-past-the-post system clearly favours the non-Aboriginal majority as even when 
Aboriginal representatives are elected they form a weak legislative minority. For 
instance, in 1996, Canada's ten Provincial Legislatures combined had only twelve 
Aboriginal representatives and only three Members of Parliament self-identified as 
1
 Federally, the 1960 Canada Elections Act extended the franchise to all Aboriginal peoples. Three 
provinces extended the franchise prior to 1960: British Columbia in 1949, Manitoba in 1952, and 
Ontario in 1954. The last province was Quebec in 1969. At earlier points in Canadian history, 
Aboriginal peoples could obtain the right to vote, but only by surrendering some or all of their 
Aboriginal rights. It should also be noted that the Inuit received the vote in 1950, while the Metis 
have always been treated the same as non-Aboriginal Canadians when it comes to voting rights. 
2
 David Bedford and Sidney Pobihushchy, "On-Reserve Status Indian Voter Participation in the 
Maritimes," The Canadian Journal of Native Studies 15, no. 2 (1995): 255-278; and, Michael 
Kinnear, "The Effect of the Expansion of the Franchise on Turnout," Electoral Insight 5, no. 3 
(2003): 46-50. Bedford and Pobihushchy found that Aboriginal participation rates dropped 
significantly since Aboriginal enfranchisement. In New Brunswick, federal participation went from 
70% in 1962 to 17.8% in 1988. In Nova Scotia, it dropped from 89.3% to 54% during the same time 
period. Kinnear's study shows a similar trend existed in Manitoba. From 1962 to 1988 Aboriginal 
participation dropped from 65.4% to 26.7%. This contrasts sharply with participation in band 
elections, which is consistently above 80% in those communities where data exists. 
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Aboriginal.3 These numbers are shocking considering that 3.8% of Canadians self-
identify as Aboriginal.4 
While the electoral system helps explain why Aboriginal peoples have difficulty 
achieving electoral success, the sense of mistrust and alienation with which many 
Aboriginal communities and individuals regard participation is perhaps more troubling. 
Comparison with the Green Party of Canada highlights this added dimension of 
mistrust, given that they face similar electoral challenges. Canadians have yet to elect 
Green Party members to any legislature despite noticeable public support, and even 
should they win some seats their impact would be, in most cases, quite marginal. 
Despite these challenges, the Green Party runs more candidates than ever before. 
Unlike Green Party supporters, Aboriginal peoples typically do not feel Canadian 
legislatures represent them or their most general principles of governance. According 
to some analysts, Aboriginal peoples feel our "shared" institutions symbolize their 
marginalization and oppression.5 They rightly feel that current representatives 
inadequately voice Aboriginal concerns and fail to secure Aboriginal interests. Instead, 
representatives tend to cater to the interests of non-Aboriginal majorities upon which 
their success depends.6 It should not be surprising that many Aboriginal peoples have 
Jonathan Malloy and Graham White, "Aboriginal Participation in Canadian Legislatures," in 
Fleming's Canadian Legislatures 1997, Eleventh Edition, eds. Robert J. Fleming and J. E. Green 
(Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1997), 61-62. British Columbia, Quebec, New Brunswick, 
Prince Edward Island, and Nova Scotia had no Aboriginal legislators. Ontario had only one. 
Canada, Statistics Canada, 2006 Census of Canada, Ottawa: Industry Canada, 2008. 
Kiera Ladner, "The Alienation of Nation: Understanding Aboriginal Electoral Participation," 
Electoral Insight 5, no. 3 (2003): 23. 
Only three of 308 federal ridings have Aboriginal majorities: Western Arctic (Northwest Territories), 
Nunavut, and Churchill (Manitoba). Found in David Small, "Enhancing Aboriginal Representation 
Within the Existing system of Redisricting," in Drawing the Map: Equality and Efficacy of the Vote 
in Canadian Electoral Boundary Reform, ed. David Small (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991), 307. 
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become sceptical of participation in Canadian elections and shared institutions. As a 
result, Aboriginal peoples tend to seek jurisdictional and institutional distance from 
non-Aboriginal-dominated institutions by demanding full self-government. 
Increasingly, however, scholars question whether autonomous self-government 
on its own is enough to secure Aboriginal self-determination.7 Alan Cairns suggests 
that small community sizes, intermarriage with non-Aboriginal Canadians, 
urbanization, and difficulties delivering services undermine normative arguments 
supporting autonomy. These factors seriously limit the capacity of self-government to 
deliver the territorial or jurisdictional control needed to realize self-determination 
understood as full autonomy. Some go even further to conclude that they reduce the 
Q 
notion of Aboriginal self-determination to near or total irrelevance. More 
optimistically, others believe self-government's empirical limitations are surmountable. 
They emphasize the necessity of greater Aboriginal participation and influence in 
shared Canadian institutions because the empirical reality makes it difficult to imagine 
such institutions not having a significant impact on Aboriginal peoples.9 Although 
7
 For examples, see Alan C. Cairns, Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State 
(Vancouver, British Columbia: UBC Press, 2000); Michael Murphy, "Understanding Indigenous 
Nationalism," in The Fate of the Nation-state, ed. Michel Seymour (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 2004), 276-279; and, John Borrows, Recovering Canada: The Resurgence 
of Indigenous Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), ch. 6. For an example involving the 
Sami peoples of Northern Scandinavia see Lars-Anders Baer, "The Right of Self-Determination and 
The Sami," in Operationalizing the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination, eds. Pekka 
Aikio and Martin Scheinin (Turku, Finland: Institute for Human Rights, Abo Akademi University, 
2000), 223-232. 
8
 Thomas Flanagan, First Nations? Second Thoughts (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's 
University Press); and, Cairns, Citizens Plus. Cairns makes this point more clearly in Alan C. Cairns, 
"First Nations and the Canadian Nation: Colonization and Constitutional Alienation," in Canadian 
Politics, 4th ed., eds. James Bickerton and Alain-G. Gagnon (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview 
Press, 2004), 355-358. 
9
 For examples, see Murphy, "Understanding Indigenous Nationalism," 278-279; Ross Poole, "The 
Nation-state and Aboriginal Self-determination," in The Fate of the Nation-state, ed. Michel 
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many may feel self-government should be the primary focus, self-government cannot 
be the only focus. 
Many scholars suggest guaranteed Aboriginal seats as a remedy.10 The idea of 
introducing guaranteed Aboriginal seats has emerged and failed in several Canadian 
provinces and at the national level.11 New Brunswick provides the most recent 
example. In 1999, New Brunswick's Aboriginal Chiefs rejected the Premier's offer of 
two guaranteed seats in the Provincial Legislature. Where strong feelings of alienation 
and mistrust exist, Aboriginal peoples seem to see such initiatives as another form of 
co-optation. They fear Canadians will misconstrue Aboriginal support for such 
measures as legitimizing past and present decisions made by Canadian governments -
decisions that generally go against their interests and restrict Aboriginal self-
determination.12 In other words, they seem to feel that the cost would be greater than 
Seymour (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 98-101; and, James 
[sakej] Youngblood Henderson, "Empowering Treaty Federalism," Saskatchewan Law Review 58 
(1994): 311-325. 
10
 For examples, see Trevor Knight, "Electoral Justice for Aboriginal People in Canada," McGill Law 
Journal 46, 4 (2001): 1036-1116; Melissa S. Williams, "Sharing the River: Aboriginal 
Representation in Canadian Political Institutions," in Representation and Democratic Theory, ed. 
David Laycock (Vancouver, British Columbia: UBC Press, 2004), 93-118; Augie Fleras, "Aboriginal 
Electoral Districts for Canada: Lessons from New Zealand," in Aboriginal Peoples and Electoral 
Reform in Canada, ed. Robert A. Milen (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991), 67-103; John Weinstein, 
Aboriginal Self-Determination Off a Land Base (Kingston, ON: Institute of Intergovernmental 
Relations, 1986), 41-49; Roger Gibbins, "Electoral Reform and Canada's Aboriginal Population: An 
Assessment of Aboriginal Electoral Districts," in Aboriginal Peoples and Electoral Reform in 
Canada, ed. Robert A. Milen (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991), 153-183; Henderson, "Empowering 
Treaty Federalism," 326-327; and, Mary Ellen Turpel, "Indigenous Peoples' Rights of Political 
Participation and Self-Determination: Recent International Legal Developments and the Continuing 
Struggle for Recognition," Cornell International Law Journal 25, no. 3 (1992): 579-600. Compare 
with Tim Schouls, "Aboriginal Peoples and Electoral Reform in Canada: Differentiated 
Representation versus Voter Equality," Canadian Journal of Political Science 29, no. 4 (1996): 729-
749. 
11
 Peter Niemczak, Aboriginal Political Representation: A Review of Several Jurisdictions (Ottawa: 
Library of Parliament, 1994). 
12
 Darrell Paul, executive director of the Union of New Brunswick Indians, stated, "What it boils down 
to is we are saying, we are a nation and, by becoming part of someone else's system, we are going to 
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the promised influence in Canadian politics (in New Brunswick just two of the more 
than fifty seats). While the type of electoral reform proposed has changed from 
enfranchisement to guaranteed seats, Aboriginal perceptions have stayed the same. 
Little Bear, Boldt, and Long capture similar perceptions of enfranchisement: "While 
some view the right to vote in federal and provincial elections as a means to effect 
desired change, many consider the Canadian government's offer of citizenship and the 
right to vote as a stratagem for undermining Indian claims to separate nationhood."13 
Like enfranchisement, two guaranteed votes in a provincial legislature struggle to give 
Aboriginal peoples influence proportionate to the impact such legislatures have in their 
lives. Yet, rejecting positive electoral reform because of mistrust, combined with self-
government's limited reach, leaves Aboriginal peoples with few options. 
This thesis endeavours to show that options do exist to make participation 
attractive and worthwhile from an Aboriginal nationalist perspective. Institutional 
reforms must take into account the psychological barriers of alienation and mistrust that 
keep many Aboriginal peoples from participating in Canadian elections and shared 
institutions. Aboriginal enfranchisement, for instance, appears to have deepened 
feelings of mistrust because the promised influence never came. In a similar way, other 
reforms will struggle to improve Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations if they fail to 
consider these psychological barriers to inclusion. I argue that encouraging Aboriginal 
participation requires reforms that do not demand that Aboriginal peoples share an 
give that up." Quoted in Knight, "Electoral Justice for Aboriginal People in Canada," 1093. Also, 
see Henderson, "Empowering Treaty Federalism," 321. 
13
 Leroy Little Bear, Menno Boldt, and J. Anthony Long, eds., Pathways to Self-Determination: 
Canadian Indians and the Canadian State (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), xvii. 
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identity with non-Aboriginal Canadians, which for some conflicts with their strongly 
held Aboriginal identity. Instead, reforms must encourage a sense of mutual 
identification with Canada by considering the reasons why Aboriginal peoples feel 
excluded and marginalized. I believe we can, and must, walk a fine line between 
avoiding a shared identity (that pushes Aboriginal peoples away) and addressing the 
psychological barriers many Aboriginal peoples feel towards participating in Canadian 
institutions. To this end, I propose reforms that I feel can bring us closer to striking a 
balance between respecting Aboriginal identities and promoting positive Aboriginal 
participation in shared decision-making. 
I break the discussion into three chapters. The first two respectively consider 
the works of Will Kymlicka and Alan Cairns, two of Canada's leading commentators 
on Aboriginal-state relations. Both focus extensively on the relationship between 
Aboriginal self-determination and Aboriginal participation in shared institutions. 
Chapter One argues that self-government's empirical limitations are more significant 
than many theorists have so far acknowledged. In particular, I express concern that 
Kymlicka overemphasizes self-government at the expense of Aboriginal participation 
in shared institutions. He generally concludes that because Aboriginal self-government 
provides exemptions from decisions made by shared institutions, it logically entails 
reduced Aboriginal representation in those institutions. This logic is sound. We should 
nevertheless find this conclusion troubling because in practice autonomous self-
government faces serious limits due to the large degree of interdependence and 
jurisdictional overlap between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities. These 
limitations challenge his justification for reducing Aboriginal participation in shared 
6 
institutions. Stressing self-government's limits and the inevitable role shared 
institutions will continue to play in Aboriginal lives, I conclude that Aboriginal peoples 
must participate in shared institutions to have a say in all decisions affecting them and 
their communities. 
The second chapter discusses Cairns' theory of "Citizens Plus." With a greater 
emphasis on interdependence and jurisdictional overlap, his theory attempts to find a 
workable middle ground between unjust assimilation policies and what he interprets as 
unrealistic Aboriginal demands for a nation-to-nation relationship. While he claims 
that a nation-to-nation relationship was plausible during the early stages of contact, the 
Aboriginal nationalist idea of parallel Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies is no 
longer practical. Therefore, unlike Kymlicka, he places a great deal of emphasis on the 
current relationship's complexity, recognizing that it drastically limits the degree of 
autonomy Aboriginal peoples can achieve. Cairns believes Aboriginal nationalists are 
chasing a red herring that, in the process, further alienates them from the non-
Aboriginal majority. Greater alienation reduces the potential for shared moral bonds of 
empathy. Without such bonds, Aboriginal peoples may find non-Aboriginal peoples 
less willing to help them achieve changes necessary for their cultural survival. 
Therefore, Aboriginal peoples must embrace a common "citizenship" that promotes our 
moral ties to one another. The "plus" secures - when possible given the complexity of 
Aboriginal circumstances - added rights that affirm Aboriginal cultural difference and 
historical priority. 
Cairns' assessment of the current relationship and its limits on Aboriginal 
autonomy is fitting. However, he fails to explain why Aboriginal peoples should 
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identify as Canadians and forgo their nationalist aspirations. Cairns ultimately 
underestimates the implications of Aboriginal mistrust towards non-Aboriginal 
Canadians, shared institutions and common citizenship. I therefore consider the 
psychological dimension of shared citizenship. While I support Cairns' call for a sense 
of solidarity and trust, the psychological dimension of shared citizenship suggests that 
achieving this goal requires that we find ways of creating a mutual sense of positive 
identification with the state without demanding a shared identity. I suggest that we 
instead require initiatives that walk a fine line between avoiding a shared identity, 
which pushes many Aboriginal peoples away, and generating the solidarity and trust 
needed for Aboriginal peoples to achieve their aims in Canadian institutions. The need 
for such changes sets the stage for the next chapter, which studies three potential 
reforms in depth. 
Chapter Three explores reforms aimed at encouraging Aboriginal participation 
in shared institutions given many Aboriginal peoples' feelings of alienation and 
mistrust. The three reforms I discuss are: 1) guaranteed Aboriginal electoral districts, 
2) co-management boards, and 3) the indigenization of shared institutions. I discuss 
how each reform brings us closer to finding a delicate balance between building the 
trust needed to encourage Aboriginal participation and avoiding the need for 
Aboriginal peoples to share an identity with non-Aboriginal Canadians. Guaranteed 
representation in Canadian legislatures through Aboriginal electoral districts, for 
starters, gives Aboriginal peoples a voice in key institutions that influence their lives 
without demanding that they vote in traditional electoral districts. At the practical 
level, this ensures that Aboriginal peoples are represented because their numbers are 
8 
too few to elect Aboriginal representatives in the vast majority of traditional electoral 
districts. At the symbolic level, it allows Aboriginal peoples to vote as Aboriginal 
peoples, reducing the risk that they may feel their participation shows support for non-
Aboriginal representatives or values. 
Similarly, co-management encourages Aboriginal participation in shared-
decision making, particularly in communities that flatly refuse to participate in central 
legislatures even with guaranteed representation or where central legislatures struggle 
to deal with more specific and local issues. Scholars generally define Co-management 
as the sharing of authority between Aboriginal peoples and the state through joint 
decision-making boards, typically over a specific area or resource. I suggest that 
seriously implementing co-management encourages Aboriginal participation in ways 
that recognize jurisdictional overlap if it allows Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
interests to mutually influence shared decisions. Lastly, I briefly discuss how 
indigenization has the potential to enhance Aboriginal perceptions of participating in 
central legislatures, on co-management boards, and within shared institutions more 
generally. Indigenization is largely about helping Aboriginal peoples positively 
identify with, and feel included within, shared institutions by representing their 
traditions, values, and cultures alongside those of the majority. It can take many forms, 
ranging from encouraging Aboriginal peoples to speak in their own languages or using 
traditional methods of political communication such as storytelling or song. Such 
reforms aim to help those with strong Aboriginal identities feel more comfortable 
participating in shared institutions. Taken together these reforms help lessen the 
mistrust that keeps Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples politically alienated from 
9 
one another. I conclude that, although deep-rooted differences between world-views 
continue, reasons exist to be cautiously optimistic that institutional reform can produce 
a more consensual relationship that shows greater respect for Aboriginal perspectives, 
rights, and interests. 
10 
Chapter One: Understanding the Limits of Aboriginal Autonomy 
Will Kymlicka is well known for his liberal justification of the state's responsibility to 
sustain and promote Aboriginal communities and cultures. He is one of several 
prominent 'liberal nationalists' who strongly support minority rights in democratic 
states. I also focus on Kymlicka's work because he specifically considers Canada's 
situation.14 He believes that the state's lack of respect for the inherent rights of 
Aboriginal peoples represents the most grievous injustice facing Canada today. This 
chapter studies Kymlicka's support for Aboriginal self-government as a response to 
this injustice. I argue that because of the varied circumstances and limited governing 
capacity of many Aboriginal communities, his more exclusive emphasis on self-
government fails to promote justice and secure inherent Aboriginal rights. In so doing, 
he neglects the role that shared institutions have in promoting Aboriginal nations and 
cultures. I divide my analysis into four sections. 
The first section provides an overview of Kymlicka's justification for self-
government and its relationship to participation in shared institutions. The second, 
third, and fourth sections outline, respectively, the diversity of Aboriginal national 
communities, the extent of Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal interdependence, and the degree 
of jurisdictional overlap between Aboriginal and Canadian orders of government. 
These last three sections suggest Kymlicka's focus on self-government fails to consider 
the complexity of Aboriginal circumstances in Canada. The conclusion explains why 
14
 Other prominent liberal nationalists include Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993); and, David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
15
 Will Kymlicka, Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 145. 
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we need a more balanced approach that recognizes self-government's limits and 
promotes greater Aboriginal participation and influence in shared institutions. 
Kymlicka and the Importance of Autonomy 
Liberal nationalists challenge the 'orthodox liberal' view that states can promote 
individual autonomy while relegating national and cultural diversity to the private 
sphere. Liberal nationalists insist the state has an obligation to protect and promote 
national and cultural diversity. Alan Patten summarizes the liberal nationalist's 
arguments in terms of three crucial steps.17 First, liberal nationalists assert the 
orthodox liberal view that liberalism must primarily promote individual freedom and 
autonomy. Kymlicka states that liberalism "grants people a very wide freedom of 
choice in terms of how they lead their lives. It allows people to choose a conception of 
the good life, and then allows them to reconsider that decision, and adopt a new and 
hopefully better plan of life."18 The second step shows that for individuals to be free 
they must have meaningful options available to them and values upon which to judge 
such options. Here, Kymlicka describes the ideal liberal state as one that 
not only allows people to pursue their current way of life, but also 
gives them access to information about other ways of life...and makes 
it possible for people to engage in radical revision of their ends 
without legal penalty. These aspects of a liberal society only make 
sense on the assumption that revising one's ends is possible, and 
sometimes desirable, because one's current ends are not always worthy 
16
 Will Kymlicka and Magda Opalski, "Introduction," in Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western 
Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, eds. Will Kymlicka and Magda Opalski 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1. 
17
 Alan Patten, "The autonomy argument for liberal nationalism," Nations and Nationalism 5, no. 1 
(1999): 1-17. 
18
 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995), 80. Also, see Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1991), 12-17. 
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of allegiance. A liberal society does not compel such questioning and 
revision, but it does make it genuinely possible.19 
The departure from liberal orthodoxy occurs in the third step, where liberal nationalists 
link the ability of individuals to exercise freedom and choice to cultural access. 
Kymlicka describes this connection as follows: "freedom involves making choices 
amongst various options, and our societal culture [our nation] not only provides these 
options, but also makes them meaningful to us."20 Secure access to our culture 
provides us with a context within which we can make meaningful choices. It is 
therefore important that liberal states take a serious interest in publicly preserving and 
promoting the cultures of its inhabitants. Yet, more often than not only majority groups 
have the cultural security needed to make meaningful choices autonomously because 
they generally control decision-making within state institutions. Without suggesting 
that such control is illegitimate on the part of dominant groups, and in fact realizing 
that the majority requires the ability to make decisions autonomously regarding their 
societal culture, Kymlicka argues that counteracting this state of affairs requires 
'group-differentiated measures' aimed at giving otherwise-threatened minorities an 
equal ability to protect and secure their national cultures. In his own words, 
government decisions on languages, internal boundaries, public 
holidays, and state symbols unavoidably involve recognizing, 
accommodating, and supporting the needs and identities of particular 
ethnic and national groups. Nor is there any reason to regret this 
fact.... In so far as existing policies support the language, culture, and 
identity of dominant nations and ethnic groups, there is an argument of 
equality for ensuring that some attempts are made to provide similar 
support for minority groups. 
19
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Discussing Canada's Aboriginal peoples, Kymlicka asserts that they require 
group-differentiated self-government rights.22 He provides three arguments for self-
government rights based on principles of equality, historical compact, and cultural 
diversity.2 Historical compacts include treaties that outline self-government rights. 
Kymlicka also feels maintaining cultural diversity can justify self-government rights. 
While valuable on their own, the latter two depend on the equality argument for their 
normative force. Therefore, for present purposes, I only consider the equality 
argument. Kymlicka argues that "[minority] self-government rights compensate for 
unequal circumstances which put the members of minority cultures at a systemic 
disadvantage in the cultural market-place, regardless of their personal choices in life."24 
Because states cannot remain neutral on issues involving national cultures, self-
government helps protect minorities from decisions made in favour of the non-
Aboriginal majority. Whether the issue is which language to use in public institutions 
or where to draw jurisdictional boundaries, the state often favours the largest national 
group over minority groups where two or more coexist. Therefore, if the majority 
makes decisions that promote its language(s), they cannot legitimately refuse national 
minorities group-differentiated measures to protect their languages. This need exists 
whether the state incorporated a national minority justly (like the Quebecois through 
confederation in 1867) or unjustly (like conquered Aboriginal peoples).25 
22
 Ibid., ch. 6; and, Kymlicka, Finding Our Way, 144-145. 
23
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25
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formed at ibid., 116-120. He concludes that the equality argument overrides historical agreements 
when the two suggest different rights for national groups. 
14 
Self-government rights often entail creating political sub-units wherein each 
national minority forms a majority. Canadian federalism accommodates the Quebecois 
in Quebec and the Inuit in Nunavut, which in both cases grant a national minority a 
degree of autonomy that allows them to protect their national culture and exercise self-
determination.26 However, the Aboriginal case of Nunavut is unique. Kymlicka 
recognizes that in most cases Aboriginal peoples' ability to self-govern is tied to 
limited reserve lands and possible future territories acquired through negotiations. 
Further, Aboriginal peoples need to come to some practical conclusions about how they 
wish to exercise self-government. They also need to determine the types of political 
sub-units that they wish the Canadian federation to recognize.27 Despite these 
challenges, Kymlicka clearly views self-government as vitally important to rectifying 
"the one real human-rights issue that we face in Canada."28 
In response to this need, Kymlicka presents a unique approach to how self-
government could look for Aboriginal communities, and its implications for Aboriginal 
representation in shared institutions. Since self-government limits the federal 
government's authority within Aboriginal communities, it should logically follow that 
Aboriginal peoples should not influence countrywide decisions they are exempt from 
following. On the other hand, Aboriginal representation is necessary on bodies that 
determine powers associated with self-government, or on bodies that resolve issues of 
concurrent or conflicting jurisdictions such as the Supreme Court.29 Kymlicka 
26
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concludes that "self-government for a national minority seems to entail guaranteed 
representation on intergovernmental bodies, which negotiate, interpret, and modify the 
division of powers, but reduced representation on federal bodies which legislate in 
areas of purely federal jurisdiction from which they are exempted."30 He argues that 
Aboriginal MPs from Aboriginal districts should not be able to vote on legislation that 
has little to no impact on their constituents.31 It might mean that Aboriginal 
representative from the prairies would need to refrain from voting on international 
fishery issues. Similarly, if an Aboriginal community builds its own public school 
system its members should not expect to influence decisions made by provincial school 
districts. It is important to note that Kymlicka does concede the possibility of central 
Aboriginal representation on an issue-specific basis,32 though he ultimately seems to 
underestimate the number of issues and jurisdictions that require such representation. 
This is partly evidenced by the limited attention he pays to this question, only briefly 
mentioning it in a footnote. In more recent works, Kymlicka further espouses a zero-
sum relationship between powers associated with Aboriginal self-government and 
representation in shared institutions.33 
Ibid., 143. See also, Philip Resnick, Thinking English Canada (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1994), 
67. Resnick calls this the dilemma of Aboriginal participation because of the difficulty associated 
with determining what decisions they should and should not participate in. 
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While Kymlicka's logic appears sound, he fails to suggest how Aboriginal 
participation in central institutions looks when autonomous self-government is limited 
or impossible. Because of significant Aboriginal national diversity and the complex 
relationship of interdependence between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples, 
substantial jurisdictional overlap appears unavoidable. As a result, shared institutions 
will continue to play a significant role in Aboriginal lives. Thus, Aboriginal peoples 
need to participate in shared institutions to have a voice in decisions that affect them 
and their communities. The next two sections look at the factors limiting Aboriginal 
self-government, followed with a section that analyses the extent and nature of 
jurisdictional overlap among Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities. These 
factors suggest that, in the Canadian context, Kymlicka overemphasizes self-
government and underemphasizes the degree of interdependence and jurisdictional 
overlap between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples and thus the need for 
Aboriginal participation in central state institutions. 
Aboriginal National Diversity: Aboriginal Peoples, Plural 
Over one million Canadians self-identify as Aboriginal. This is a considerable when 
one considers that nearly a quarter of modern nation-states have smaller populations. 
Some comparable examples include Estonia (1.3 million) and Cyprus (0.8 million). 
Other Western democracies have dramatically smaller populations, such as 
Luxembourg (0.5 million) and Iceland (0.3 million). These small nation-states 
exercise self-government and make decisions about their collective and individual 
34
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futures largely free from external dominance. However, such comparisons quickly 
become problematic. The discussion so far has hinted at plural Aboriginal peoples, not 
a singular people. This section seeks to understand the many Aboriginal peoples of 
Canada. 
The Constitution Act, 1982, section 35(2) states, '"aboriginal peoples of 
Canada' includes the Indian, Inuit and Metis peoples of Canada." This threefold 
categorization marks only the beginning of Aboriginal diversity within Canada. 
'Indians' are the most numerous of Aboriginal peoples and are often mistakenly 
discussed as if they were the only Aboriginal peoples. 'Indians' comprise 60%, or just 
under 700,000 of the self-identified Aboriginal population.35 The Indian Act further 
divides 'Indians' into status and non-status categories. "Status is inherited. Aboriginal 
people may have status because they are descendents of treaty signatories or because 
status was granted to an ancestor at some time by administrative fiat."36 
Status Indians account for the majority of on-reserve Aboriginal peoples. 
Under the Indian Act, 2,000 separate communities fall under the jurisdiction of 627 
bands. Created in colonialism's wake, most bands and reserves represent only portions 
of nations. Together they comprise 40 to 100 nations based on typical international 
standards of cultural similarity and historical continuity.37 Examples include the Dene, 
35
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36
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Nuu-chal-nulth, Cree, Anishinaabe, Mi'kmaq, and Innu. The populations of bands and 
nations vary substantially. With Indian bands, less than six per cent have on-reserve 
populations over 2,000 people, about two-third have populations under 500, and almost 
twenty per cent have populations under 100. Aboriginal nations have average 
populations of 5,000 to 7,000 people, with some as low as 2,000 people.39 These 
statistics alone suggest significant Aboriginal diversity, yet they do not consider Inuit 
and Metis peoples. 
With 50,000 people, the Inuit represent 4.3% of Canada's Aboriginal 
population. Most Inuit live north of the 60l parallel in dozens of communities. Up 
until the latter half of the 20th century, the Inuit had minimal contact with non-
Aboriginal peoples. A 1939 Supreme Court decision ruled that matters concerning the 
Inuit were the federal government's responsibility and that they ought to be treated like 
status Indians.40 The relationship has intensified as non-Aboriginal peoples have 
increasingly taken an interest in arctic and sub-arctic affairs. The largest community, 
Iqaluit, has 3,000 Inuit.41 Half of the Inuit population live in the recently created 
territory of Nunavut, where they form a majority and, de facto, exercise self-
government.42 Most others live in three other regions: Nunavik (northern Quebec), 
Nunatsiavut (Labrador), and the Inuvialuit Settlement Region (Northwest Territories). 
38
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Non-Aboriginal settlement has been relatively sparse in Inuit communities. This 
history has led to a unique relationship with the Canadian government as evidenced by 
the establishment of Nunavut and Nunavik. 
Finally, the most recent census shows nearly 400,000 Metis people live in 
Canada. 3 Metis peoples do not receive the same entitlements as status Indians or the 
Inuit.44 The Metis are so-called mixed-heritage peoples who generally trace their 
heritage back to marriages between Western Aboriginal peoples and early non-
Aboriginal traders. Their mixed heritage failed to give them a foot in either world and, 
instead, created a national identity unto itself.45 Approximately three-quarters live in 
British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba. The rest live primarily, 
though not exclusively, in Ontario, the Northwest Territories, and the Northwest United 
States. Small numbers exist all across Canada. Although most live without a land-base 
of their own, some Metis peoples in Alberta and Manitoba enjoy a land-base where 
they exercise limited self-government rights.46 The preceding description clearly 
shows that when we talk about Aboriginal self-government in Canada we must 
consider that potentially hundreds of nations exist. Within Canada, then, are many 
Aboriginal "micro-nations."47 Kymlicka recognizes that the sheer number of 
Aboriginal communities makes self-government difficult, but does not give this the 
43
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attention it deserves. He sympathizes with the idea that the 40 to 100 First Nations 
would be ideal sub-units for self-government, although he believes Aboriginal peoples 
must ultimately decide themselves the number and composition of self-governing 
Aboriginal communities. As the rest of the chapter shows, Kymlicka seriously 
underestimates the practical limitations Aboriginal nations face in pursuing self-
government. 
Complex Interdependence: The Demographic Reality 
Aboriginal nations are no longer isolated from the outside world. In fact, contact 
helped create new Aboriginal nations such as the Metis who formed from relationships 
between Aboriginal peoples and early European colonialists. Since contact, 
Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal intermingling has increased with few signs of retreat. To 
highlight the complexity of the interdependence among Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
peoples I look at two significant factors that challenge the ways we recognize 
Aboriginal nations: Aboriginal urbanization (geographic interdependence) and 
intermarriage (an indicator of social interdependence). 
Aboriginal urbanization is a Canadian reality. Half of Aboriginal peoples live 
in urban centres. Twenty-five per cent live in just 10 metropolitan areas. Even 
though many live in urban centres, Aboriginal peoples do not form anything 
approaching a majority in any of Canada's medium-to-large cities.49 Urban Aboriginal 
48
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populations grew significantly when the Canadian Government passed Bill C-31 in 
1985, which outlined amendments to the Indian Act that restored status to over a 
hundred thousand Aboriginal peoples to whom it was previously denied because of 
discriminatory regulations. Urban Aboriginal populations are also heterogeneous. 
They comprise many different 'Indian' communities, Metis (particularly in Western 
Canada), and an increasing number of non-status populations resulting from 
intermarriage.50 Emerging urban communities divide Aboriginal loyalties between 
'old' reserve-based identities and 'new' urban identities. Generally, urban Aboriginal 
peoples enjoy significantly better socio-economic conditions than on-reserve 
populations.51 However, most urban Aboriginal peoples live in relative poverty and in 
many cases live in ghetto-like neighbourhoods.52 Depending on which reserve one has 
ties with, living in urban areas is better or worse than living on-reserve. For some only 
reserve-life offers a sense of place while culturally foreign cities provide greater socio-
economic security.53 On the other hand, some scholars suggest that Aboriginal peoples 
in urban centres face extreme poverty compared to fellow community members living 
Evelyn J. Peters, "Geographies of Aboriginal Self-Government," in Aboriginal Self-Government in 
Canada, ed. John H. Hylton (Saskatoon, Saskatchewan: Purich Publishing, 1999), 6-10; and, Cairns, 
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on some reserves. Because of varied experiences on- and off-reserve it should come 
as no surprise that half of urban Aboriginal peoples would ideally prefer to live on a 
reserve.55 It is imaginable that others prefer an urban existence, perhaps even 
achieving socio-economic and cultural happiness comparable to the wider population. 
In sharp contrast to this, however, ambivalence leads some to maintain dual residence, 
or to live transient lives where neither location provides a full life.56 Although 
sometimes net-migration numbers show more Aboriginal peoples moving back to 
reserves than moving from reserves to cities, population growth in the overwhelming 
majority of Aboriginal communities ensures that geographic interdependence continues 
to increase in urban areas. 
Our interdependence is not only geographic, but social as well. Intermarriage is 
common between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people. Based on an understanding 
of intermarriage as marriage or cohabitation between a status Indian and a non-status 
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United States, and New Zealand (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992), 18. This is also the 
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Aboriginal or non-Aboriginal, 58% of off-reserve and 23% of on-reserve Aboriginal 
peoples are intermarried.57 Since Bill C-31 stipulates that two consecutive generations 
of intermarriage leads to the third's loss of status, status Indian populations face 
decline.58 In a speech given to the Native Women's Association of Canada, Metis 
leader Harry Daniels argues that Bill C-31 takes away the ability of Aboriginal 
communities to maintain status overall. 
The Federal Government could theoretically have given women the 
same powers that Indian men enjoyed under the old [Indian Act]. All 
Status Indians, whether male or female, would thereby have acquired 
the ability to pass on status to their children [and partners], irrespective 
of the ethnic background of their partners. This would have been a 
reasonable solution and in keeping with our traditions. However, this 
is not what Bill C-31 does. Rather, the Bill places men in a position 
akin to that of women under the old Act. Now men as well as women 
can lose their ability to confer status on their children.59 
Studies of Australia's Aboriginal peoples indicate intermarried parents overwhelmingly 
pass Aboriginal identity on to their children.60 Aboriginal peoples in Canada likely 
share such a view. Taken to its extreme, Daniels' view would produce the opposite 
result whereby an ever-increasing number of Canadians would have status entitlements. 
Intermarriage forces us to ask serious questions about how we define Indian status and, 
more generally, the impact social interaction between Aboriginal peoples and non-
Aboriginal peoples will have on once separate nations. Like modern nation-states, 
57
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Aboriginal peoples desire a say on who belongs and who does not - something 
currently determined by Canadian legislation. The fact that this question remains 
prominent in the minds of non-Aboriginal and Aboriginal leaders alike shows the 
importance of intermarriage and how we define who has Aboriginal rights and who 
does not. 
A final trend is worth considering. From 1996 to 2001, Canada's self-
identifying Aboriginal population increased at a rate nearly seven times higher than the 
non-Aboriginal population (22.2% compared to 3.4%). Higher birth rates, better 
enumeration techniques, and increased self-awareness contribute to this sharp 
increase.61 Of the three factors, the last might be more prominent than one might 
suspect. The Metis population grew the most (an amazing 43%). Rapid growth within 
the Metis community should not come entirely as a surprise because the Metis 
community represents an Aboriginal community that is very inclusive of those with 
mixed-ancestry. For instance, many children who do not gain status despite Aboriginal 
ancestry may exercise, at least to some extent, their Aboriginal identity in this fashion. 
This trend both reflects and reinforces social and geographic interpenetration between 
those who identify as Aboriginal and those who identify as non-Aboriginal. Social and 
geographic interdependence between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples is an 
increasing and irreversible reality. 
For the most part, Kymlicka overlooks the complexity of Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal interdependence. He does not discuss increasing Aboriginal urbanization 
and social interdependence, which strain against territorial self-government. For urban 
61
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(or intermarried) Aboriginal peoples, autonomy (or divorce) is not always a feasible or 
fair option. Self-government as autonomy seems inapplicable to situations defined by 
geographic and social interdependence and, thus, fails to secure rights necessary to 
protect Aboriginal peoples from the majority's decisions. The political consequence of 
this interdependence and overlap, as I discuss next, is an unavoidable relationship that 
requires Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples to participate jointly in shared 
institutions such as the courts, local governments, provincial legislatures and the House 
of Commons. 
Jurisdictional Overlap: An Unavoidable Political Relationship 
Kymlicka's strong support for Aboriginal jurisdiction over matters that protect and 
promote their national cultures resonates with many Aboriginal peoples. Allen Paul, 
former Chief of the Alexander First Nation in Alberta, equates Aboriginal governments 
awakening after decades of marginalization with a hibernating bear. Like the bear 
hibernating to survive the cold winter, Aboriginal government only appeared dead. 
"When this bear wakes up, it has to do a lot of things. It has to start rebuilding its 
energy, some of its thinking, how it is going to survive [sic]...we have to start 
rebuilding [our] institutions, to start rebuilding our strength."62 This section contends 
that factors related to Aboriginal diversity and interdependence make jurisdictional 
overlap unavoidable, and oftentimes desirable. Though Aboriginal people wish to re-
establish jurisdiction over culture, education, elder care, child welfare, and over many 
other issues, significant jurisdictional overlap exists in most areas because of factors 
62
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related to Aboriginal diversity, limited capacity, and interdependence. Such overlap 
ensures that the state and Aboriginal nations concurrently exercise authority over these 
matters on behalf of Aboriginal peoples. This leads me to conclude that Aboriginal 
peoples must have a permanent place in shared decision-making bodies that govern 
shared jurisdictions. 
Sizeable overlap exists even where self-government promises the most - in 
reserve-based communities. The jurisdictions of Aboriginal reserve-based 
communities unavoidably overlap with non-Aboriginal jurisdictions because of limited 
community capacity and off-reserve populations. Aboriginal nations average only 
5,000 to 7,000 people with many having significantly smaller populations. These 
micro-nations face serious capacity-related challenges. While, de jure, Aboriginal 
governments may have full jurisdictional authority in all areas, de facto, they will 
continue to rely on other levels of governments to deliver key services. For example, 
the human resource needs of Aboriginal governments exceed demands related to 
internal affairs and external relations with other levels of government.63 Shortages of 
professionals in many areas force Aboriginal governments to choose between seeking 
external support to deliver services themselves and allowing other levels of government 
to provide key services. For the foreseeable future Aboriginal jurisdiction over health 
seems unlikely to lead to Aboriginal peoples training their own specialists in their own 
Cairns, Citizens Plus, 139-142; and McDonnell and Depew, "Aboriginal Self-Government and Self-
Determination in Canada," 356. 
27 
hospitals. When Aboriginal governments deny these limitations and attempt to take 
on jurisdictions and fail it often compels community members to seek services 
elsewhere.65 From simply a perspective of rights, Aboriginal peoples as Canadian 
citizens can easily circumvent Aboriginal orders of government and choose to visit off-
reserve hospitals if they feel Aboriginal governments provide inadequate care. Such 
limits bring attention to the significant limits of self-government and the need for 
cooperation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples. 
In other areas, self-government cannot give Aboriginal peoples absolute 
autonomy from external influence. In areas that do not respect political boundaries, 
such as environmental and fisheries policy, it seems impossible for self-government 
alone to promote Aboriginal interests. If the wider community places a large mine 
operation near an Aboriginal community the impacts could be significant. Kiera 
Ladner discusses concurrent jurisdictions around the east coast salmon fishery.67 Both 
the state and the Mi'kmaq view the fishery as fully their responsibility. She concludes 
that peacefully resolving the dispute requires each side to recognize that jurisdictional 
overlap exists and that both sides must approach issues together despite their contrary 
justifications for exclusive control. 
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A final example suggests it would be hard to think of any jurisdiction that 
Aboriginal governments could exercise alone. Kymlicka repeatedly places significant 
emphasis on self-government over language as necessary to protect national cultures. 
Nearly all Aboriginal languages require positive measures to survive. Most 
endangered languages require external financial, academic, and technical assistance. 
Assistance becomes even more necessary where complex interdependence exists and 
where English or French dominates public life. In an attempt to protect Northern 
British Columbia's Aboriginal languages, the University of Northern British Columbia 
has developed curricula focused on threatened languages in the area. The University 
teaches the Nisga'a, Tsimshian and Haisla languages that, respectively, have only 795, 
465, and 240 speakers.70 Local speakers and university professors co-teach with the 
intent of eventually phasing out the professor's role. For capacity-related reasons, most 
courses continue to require the professor's expertise.71 While the goal is autonomy, 
external assistance can bring positive benefits to Aboriginal peoples. The University's 
continued assistance assuredly helps Aboriginal communities sustain languages 
Aboriginal peoples consider valuable and that might otherwise become extinct. 
The second point is perhaps more straightforward. Complex interdependence 
makes it difficult for Aboriginal communities to govern exclusively the lives of 
migratory and permanently off-reserve populations. Numbers show most 'Indians' opt 
68
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to live in either urban centres or rural off-reserve locations instead of self-governing 
communities.72 Melissa Williams observes that while increased Aboriginal 
jurisdictional powers have "implications for Aboriginal people [mainly status Indians] 
living off-reserve, it is difficult if not impossible to imagine a regime in which such 
individuals' lives could be wholly covered by Aboriginal jurisdictions."73 Whether 
members permanently live off-reserve or migrate back and forth, non-Aboriginal 
governments influence significant portions of their lives. The same logic applies to 
Aboriginal peoples without access to a land-base. Most non-status Indians and Metis 
peoples receive minimal, if any, direct benefits from self-government agreements made 
with status Indians. Solutions other than territorial self-government must be considered 
to secure and promote Aboriginal aspirations. 
Some believe that expanding self-government's scope or the size of the 
governing units can overcome jurisdictional overlap. One response suggests 
Aboriginal nations should amalgamate to achieve economies of scale. 
Amalgamation would allow them to combine expertise and resources to establish 
coordinated Aboriginal institutions such as the All Nations Institute in British 
Columbia, which offers various post-secondary programs with an Aboriginal focus. 
Saskatchewan provides a more comprehensive example. Over seventy communities 
representing more than 115,000 members are considering taking part in a province-
wide system of Aboriginal governance. It would see services delivered both on- and 
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off-reserve by various levels of Aboriginal government that descend from a single 
province-wide government, through five regional (treaty-based) governments, all the 
way down to local governments. The hope is that aggregating Aboriginal jurisdictions 
will "drastically increase the possibilities for meaningful, effective and efficient 
governance."75 
The idea of "satellite" reserves provides a second solution to the limits 
urbanization places on self-governing communities. Saskatchewan supports "satellite" 
reserves linked to "parent" reserves.76 Urban satellite reserves "are properties in urban 
areas that are controlled and administered by Indian governments.... Under the Indian 
Act, they have exactly the same legal status as Indian reserves found in rural areas."77 
They allow parent reserves to establish housing, schools, hospitals, and so forth. 
Satellite reserves provide only those Aboriginal individuals fortunate enough to have 
access to parent reserves with consistency as they access services under the same 
jurisdiction despite migrating to difference centres. Amalgamation and satellite 
reserves offer some Aboriginal governments greater choice in offering services to their 
members. 
Critics suggest that attempts to enlarge self-governing units face serious limits 
related to geography and identity. Some solutions underestimate self-government's 
spatial limits. Peters argues that fragmented administrative areas have less 
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accountability and risk greater socio-economic disparity between community 
members.78 Parent reserves and amalgamated governments may focus less on, 
respectively, satellite reserves and smaller communities. It could leave those they 
mean to serve with little option but to seek services elsewhere. I would add that it also 
risks creating confusion among non-Aboriginal communities. For example, some may 
feel that Aboriginal people abuse the system when sending their children to 'non-
Aboriginal' schools because a separate school system exists on-reserve. Non-
Aboriginal Canadians may be less willing to assist, expecting Aboriginal peoples to 
seek help with parent reserves or the larger Aboriginal government. Worse, non-
Aboriginal communities may undertake initiatives assuming Aboriginal peoples have 
permanently opted out of using services under non-Aboriginal jurisdiction. Aboriginal 
governments need to keep these risks in mind as they take on greater responsibility 
with varying degrees of success. 
Some suggest amalgamation and satellite reserves will clash with Aboriginal 
identities.79 Ladner believes amalgamation perpetuates colonialism's goal of 
marginalizing national communities possibly to the point of extinction. It forces 
smaller communities to share jurisdictions with other communities because the 
Canadian state effectively reduced their ability to govern independently, leading some 
communities to resist amalgamation. Aboriginal peoples might also resist 
amalgamation at an individual level if they feel new Aboriginal governance structures 
78
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threaten their self-identity. One can imagine cases where amalgamation fractures or 
weakens communities instead of strengthening them. A hypothetical consequence of 
amalgamation in Saskatchewan helps highlight this possibility. Because the Cree may 
dominate an amalgamated government, smaller language groups may feel they can 
better protect their communities by isolating themselves or by directly seeking 
assistance from the provincial or federal government, effectively circumventing 
amalgamated governance structures. 
Efforts to expand self-government's scope might help combine the resources of 
two or more nations or prevent a reserve-based community from losing significant 
portions of their populations to other jurisdictions. On the one hand, Canadians should 
support Aboriginal desires to pursue such initiatives. On the other hand, amalgamation 
merely changes the contours that define the degree and nature of jurisdictional overlap. 
Overlap will still exist in areas that do not respect political boundaries, such as the 
environment and fisheries. It is also hard to imagine Aboriginal people not using 
provincially and federally regulated roads, airlines, universities, hospitals, sewer, water 
systems, and so on. Urban Aboriginal peoples will find themselves migrating daily 
between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal jurisdictions depending on where they live, see 
doctors, or go to school. They might wake up in an "Aboriginal" house, travel down a 
"non-Aboriginal" road, and enter an "Aboriginal" school. Overlapping jurisdictions 
are an every-day reality for Aboriginal peoples in Canada. Although efforts to expand 
self-government work in some areas and serve some purposes, I remain unconvinced 
that they could dramatically reduce jurisdictional overlap. 
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So far, I have intentionally avoided discussing jurisdictional overlap's benefits. 
Focus on the unavoidable aspects of overlap risks overlooking its benefits - benefits 
too great to ignore. Some examples appeal to one's common sense. It would not make 
sense for the Coast Salish people to establish an international airport when two already 
exist within their traditional territories. The same logic applies to other jurisdictions 
such as roads, telecommunications, and foreign affairs. George Watts, of the Nuu-
chah-nulth people says, "you guys can keep the post office, we don't want it [and]... 
on 
we are really not interested in starting up an army or an airforce [sic] or a navy." 
Using Watts' post office example, I doubt he feels the Nuu-chah-nulth people should 
stop using Canada Post and deliver their mail themselves. However, his statement does 
not mean that a Nuu-chah-nulth mail system is impossible or undesirable. Although 
possible, it would require a significant percentage of their population to administer and 
would thus divert significant attention away from other projects. It may one day 
become desirable should Canada Post's delivery standards no longer meet their needs. 
For now, the status quo helps by not burdening the Nuu-chah-nulth people with extra 
costs as they pursue ends more urgent at present than mail delivery or international 
security. 
Comparison with some of Europe's microstates suggests similar benefits. 
Liechtenstein, a country of 33,000 people situated between Switzerland and Austria, 
shares many jurisdictions with its neighbours. Its links with Switzerland run deep. In 
1924, Liechtenstein and Switzerland formed a single economic area. Liechtenstein 
uses Switzerland's currency and staffs its border with Swiss customs officers. The two 
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countries also share embassies, not to mention television stations and 
telecommunication networks. Close links also exist with Austria. The Osterreichische 
01 
Bundesbahnen (Austrian Federal Railway) maintains Liechtenstein's rail network. 
Cooperation provides Liechtenstein services in areas difficult or impossible for small 
states to deliver alone.82 Choosing to end its relationships would force the people of 
Liechtenstein to face tough decisions on how to use their limited resources. Will they 
open embassies in all countries or only a few? Will it mean less fire or police 
protection to secure the borders? Cooperation with Switzerland and Austria helps the 
people of Liechtenstein deliver achieve objects that they would otherwise struggle with 
given their limited capacity and population. Similar relationships exist between small 
states such as Monaco, San Marino, and Andorra and their respective larger neighbours 
of France, Italy, and Spain. 
Complex interdependence and national diversity pose significant challenges for 
Aboriginal governments who wish to deliver an array of services independent of 
Canadian governments. Because these challenges are often insurmountable, and 
because jurisdictional overlap is the norm even under generous self-government 
agreements, it appears inevitable that Aboriginal self-determination cannot easily occur 
unless Aboriginal peoples participate alongside the wider community in shared 
institutions that govern areas of shared jurisdiction. Moreover, Aboriginal peoples 
should not see participation in shared institutions as minor or temporary because 
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jurisdictional overlap exists in so many areas and to such a large degree. Promoting 
total independence risks pushing members towards non-Aboriginal jurisdictions. 
Solutions such as amalgamation and the creation of satellite reserves suggest that 
Aboriginal peoples have choices between which jurisdictions to promote and with 
whom to promote them. However, expanding self-government's scope quickly 
exacerbates jurisdictional problems related to Aboriginal diversity, capacity, and 
interdependence. Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples are in an unavoidable 
political relationship. Fortunately, the relationship can be mutually beneficial if it 
acknowledges that Aboriginal peoples have a part to play in managing overlapping 
jurisdictions through greater participation in shared institutions. 
Conclusion 
In Canada, self-government only partially protects and promotes Aboriginal national 
communities. Significant Aboriginal diversity, interdependence, and jurisdictional 
overlap ensure that self-government promises more in theory than it delivers in 
practice. Kymlicka recognizes that Aboriginal diversity causes problems and that 
jurisdictional overlap creates the need for Aboriginal participation in shared institutions 
on an issue-specific basis. However, he underestimates the extent of jurisdictional 
overlap and, thus, fails to recognize that it pervades nearly all aspects of the 
relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal governments. The number of 
"issue-specific" areas requiring Aboriginal participation arguably approaches the 
jurisdictional authority of Canada's shared institutions. Further, the scope of 
Aboriginal self-government for each nation would vary, creating chaos in our 
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legislatures as voting entitlements vary from one Aboriginal nation to the next and 
from one issue to the next. Determining varied voting entitlements would be a further 
source of division leading to hostility and gridlock because jurisdictional control will 
never be total but a matter of degree. A single vote cannot represent shades of grey. 
Proposing a standard of voting equality that does not exist in any representative 
institution seems unrealistic. After all, Members of Parliament from Nova Scotia and 
Manitoba have the same voting entitlements whether the issue more directly affects the 
constituents of the former (such as Atlantic salmon stocks) or the latter (such as 
agriculture). 
If Aboriginal peoples focus solely on autonomous self-government they may 
find their communities' continued existence threatened. While autonomy helps 
preserve and promote some national cultures that do not have issues arising from 
limited capacity and complex interdependence, the situation facing Aboriginal nations 
in Canada makes absolute autonomy impossible in most cases. As the examples of 
amalgamation and satellite reserves show, expanding self-government's scope can 
sometimes divide communities. Canada's provincial and federal jurisdictions will 
continue to impact Aboriginal communities whether Aboriginal peoples can achieve 
significant autonomy or not. Aboriginal participation in Canadian institutions 
represents a positive step because it gives Aboriginal peoples greater control over 
decision affecting them and their communities. The next section begins our search for 
political solutions to this highly complex relationship. 
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Chapter Two: In Search of Effective Shared Citizenship 
The first chapter suggested that (re)establishing and maintaining entirely separate 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal jurisdictions is extremely difficult, if not impossible. 
We must therefore consider how best to live together. In recent years, Alan Cairns has 
received considerable attention for his discussion of the subject of shared citizenship in 
Canada. He attaches greater significance to Aboriginal diversity and interdependence 
than Kymlicka. Although Cairns recognizes that the possibility of complete separation 
may once have existed, geographic and social interpenetration have since ensured our 
continued coexistence. The inability to separate leads him to conclude that promoting 
Aboriginal rights and interests depends largely on Aboriginal participation in shared 
institutions; to shun participation in Canadian elections and institutions, in his view, 
limits the capacity of Aboriginal peoples to control their individual and collective 
futures.83 Therefore, we require a political theory of citizenship that allows Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal peoples to participate in a "pan-Canadian community engaged in 
common tasks...as a single political people."84 Cairns offers "citizens plus" as such a 
theory. 
This chapter begins by analyzing "citizens plus" as a middle ground between 
assimilationism and Aboriginal nationalism. Given our interdependence, Cairns 
suggests that building trust requires abandoning our colonial past and recognizing 
Aboriginal difference, i.e., their unique rights, identities, and traditions. Recognizing 
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such difference helps overcome assimilation's normative and practical challenges. It is 
also a practical necessity for improving Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations. Cairns is 
equally critical of Aboriginal nationalism for ignoring the need for solidarity and trust 
in its quest for separate Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies. I agree with Cairns 
on these counts. Abandoning colonialism and recognizing Aboriginal difference are 
imperative for promoting positive Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations and encouraging 
Aboriginal participation in shared institutions. Yet, I propose that Cairns' theory, and 
its insistence on a shared identity, cannot get us to such a point. To flesh out this 
criticism, I look at reasons why Aboriginal peoples might reject "citizens plus." The 
final section considers alternative means for generating the solidarity and trust required 
for shared citizenship to lead to meaningful change. 
"Citizens Plus": A Solution to Our Complex Interdependence 
The fundamental question in Cairns' Citizens Plus is one that he believes has been 
central to Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations since Europeans settled in Canada 
centuries ago. "Is the goal a single society with one basic model of belonging, or is the 
goal a kind of parallelism - a side by side coexistence - or some intermediate 
position?"85 As I read it, Cairns' "intermediate position" called "citizens plus" has four 
crucial aspects: 1) Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal futures cannot be separated, 2) we 
must address our colonial past, 3) we must recognize Aboriginal difference, and 4) 
Aboriginal nationalist legal and political scholars must come to realize that their goal of 
parallel societies is unattainable. The section concludes by considering why Cairns 
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believes his theory better addresses the relationship between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal peoples. 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal futures are inseparable. 
Much more so than Kymlicka, Cairns emphasizes the Canadian state's unavoidable 
impact on Aboriginal peoples. He focuses on many of the factors discussed in the first 
chapter of this thesis such as the fact that, geographically, over half of all Aboriginal 
OS 
peoples live off-reserve alongside non-Aboriginal Canadians. He highlights how 
such geographic interpenetration coincides with socio-cultural interpenetration: 
Aboriginal societies, like all other societies, are penetrated societies. 
Their members live in many worlds at once, and relate to more than 
one community.... They should not, therefore, be viewed as if they 
were whole societies with only minimal relations with the Canadian 
• 87 
society. 
As evidence of significant interpenetration, Cairns examines changing Aboriginal 
identities and patterns of interaction, such as the fact that over one-third of those with 
Aboriginal ancestry do not self-identify as Aboriginal.88 Cairns emphasizes the 
empirical limitations that are not fully considered in Kymlicka's work - factors that 
make the idea of anything even close to absolute autonomy for Aboriginal peoples 
difficult to fathom. 
Empirical factors ensure that our political futures are strongly linked because 
Aboriginal governments cannot disengage from federal and provincial levels of 
government without significant socio-economic consequences. Even large Aboriginal 
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communities struggle to provide the full complement of services expected from an 
effective government, as they use most of their resources to manage intergovernmental 
relations and maintain an effective bureaucracy.89 The problem compounds greatly for 
smaller communities. Cairns rightly suggests that there will be "continuing relations] 
between members of Aboriginal nations and the federal and provincial governments." 
In line with discussion in the previous chapter, the idea that we are increasingly and 
irreversibly part of one another's lives provides a strong empirical thread that runs 
through Cairns' work. 
We must address our assimilationist-colonialist legacy for both normative & practical 
reasons. 
Cairns applauds the global collapse of colonialism, which initially saw European 
powers pull out of their overseas colonies in places such as Africa and Asia. However, 
decolonization within nation-states is much more difficult than between European 
powers and overseas colonies. Unlike the initial stage, where European powers left 
distant colonies, Aboriginal peoples in Canada cannot simply demand that non-
Aboriginal Canadians leave. 
An overseas imperial power can pack up its flags and depart. Settler 
majorities, however, cannot scuttle and run as the Belgians did in the 
Congo. They remain behind as majorities. They have no distant home 
across the oceans to return to as had the imperial administrative class 
displaced by indigenization in tropical colonies. 
Cairns also strongly rejects assimilation as a solution for situations where colonizers 
and indigenous peoples coexist. He criticizes traditional "Canadian policy [that] 
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assumed the erosion of Aboriginal difference on the road to homogeneity." He calls 
such policies "arrogant and illegitimate" because they unjustly suppose a cultural 
hierarchy between superior whites and inferior non-whites. 
Cairns also argues that assimilation failed because of three practical factors: 
global pressure, Aboriginal resistance, and non-Aboriginal discrimination. First, global 
forces provided the "trigger" or "catalyst" for domestic change. Cairns says, "it is 
easier to underestimate than to overestimate the impact of external developments on 
domestic politics."93 The 20th century saw the international community 
overwhelmingly support decolonization, putting considerable pressure on Canadian 
governments to adapt or abandon their assimilationist Aboriginal policies or risk being 
shamed.94 Second, continual Aboriginal resistance allowed their communities, 
cultures, and identities to survive generations of assimilationist policies. Resistance 
manifested itself in many ways: children avoided residential schools, communities 
practiced traditional ceremonies in secret, and successive generations continued to pass 
on political traditions and beliefs.95 Aboriginal peoples saw assimilation as "a white, 
majority, government policy [whose] hegemony was always more apparent than 
real."96 In other words, despite the fact that Canadian governments argued that 
Aboriginal peoples were on their way to becoming assimilated, Aboriginal resistance 
better described the reality within Aboriginal communities. Third, for non-Aboriginal 
Canadians the official government policy was also more of an ideal than a reality. 
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Though government leaders sought difference-blind assimilation, the reality was that 
non-Aboriginal discrimination defined everyday Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal interaction. 
"Insulted, humiliated, and rebuffed in their encounters with white society, Indians were 
unlikely to see assimilation as an escape from what they were told was a backward 
culture."97 Even those who rejected their Aboriginal heritage to embrace assimilation 
often struggled for acceptance within mainstream society. 
In the end, global trends, Aboriginal resistance, and non-Aboriginal 
discrimination led to the near-total defeat of assimilationist policy during the 1960s and 
1970s. Cairns summarizes assimilation's false promise as follows: "we were to be 
held together by citizenship after Aboriginal cultures had confirmed the premise of 
social Darwinism, and disappeared. That is not where we are today." Instead, 
assimilationist policies have played a considerable role in entrenching Aboriginal 
identities and promoting feelings of alienation and mistrust toward the wider 
community. 
We must recognize Aboriginal difference 
Cairns subscribes to the increasingly common view that recognizing similarities and 
differences does not depart from the norm of equality. In fact, in practice it reinforces 
equality." He suggests that we require a theory that "simultaneously recognizes both 
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Aboriginal difference and the need for connection to, involvement with, and 
participation in the Canadian community."100 In many ways, recognizing difference is 
the obvious alternative to assimilation's aim of suppressing Aboriginal difference. As 
Cairns suggests, it avoids many of assimilation's moral and practical challenges. He 
rejects the idea that "[Aboriginal peoples] can only become full members of Canadian 
society by ceasing to be [themselves]."101 They should be equally able to express 
themselves by sharing their diverse understandings of history, society, and how we 
should live together. We should therefore support self-government as the "most 
significant" way for Aboriginal peoples to exercise self-determination, allowing them 
to "transform the cultural assumptions and practices that supported Aboriginal 
marginalization and subordination."102 Self-government also helps Aboriginal peoples 
sustain their communities and make decisions regarding their individual and collective 
futures.103 Moreover, recognizing difference means giving Aboriginal peoples an equal 
say in Canada's future, because their lives interconnect with the Canadian state and its 
non-Aboriginal population.104 Assimilationist policies made it difficult, if not 
impossible, for Aboriginal peoples to exercise self-determination, to participate in 
decisions affecting them, and to sustain their communities. Recognizing difference 
promotes equality by, at minimum, giving Aboriginal peoples a voice that allows them 
to ignite discussions that will hopefully lead to Aboriginal peoples having opportunities 
to influence important decisions and promote their futures. 
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Aboriginal nationalist discourses overemphasize independence and underemphasize 
the need for solidarity with non-Aboriginal Canadians. 
According to Cairns, Aboriginal nationalists idealistically dream of returning to a time 
when separate Aboriginal societies flourished without interference from - and the need 
to work with - outsiders. To highlight his point, Cairns pays particular attention to the 
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, which conducted hearings with Aboriginal 
peoples all across Canada and was released in November 1996. He expresses concern 
that, in their submissions, Aboriginal peoples focused primarily, and almost 
exclusively, on how they could live apart from Canadian orders of government. 5 He 
feels they do so because they misinterpret contemporary circumstances in their desire 
to separate Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal paths. "The most frequent image of self-
chosen Aboriginal futures is of parallelism-Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
communities travelling side by side, coexisting but not getting in each other's way."106 
Cairns believes that contemporary Aboriginal visions - based on the Royal 
Commission of Aboriginal Peoples, the Two Row Wampum, treaty federalism, third 
order of government, nation-to-nation relationships, and current theories of legal 
pluralism - are overwhelmingly parallelist theories that underemphasize, or entirely 
ignore, the interdependence of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies.107 Such 
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approaches deny that "even where the maximum of self-government is possible, it will 
fall far short of total independence."108 
Cairns believes that, at best, Aboriginal communities can only effectively 
govern within select jurisdictions. Examples include education, membership 
regulations, local economic activities, cultural promotion, and family services. Even 
with external support, Aboriginal peoples may find exercising such core jurisdictions 
challenging. Cairns thus feels that for most Aboriginal people living off-reserve 
parallelism's insistence on autonomous Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies has 
little or no meaning since non-Aboriginal governments will continue to deliver most 
services.110 Parallelism therefore largely ignores many Aboriginal people, particularly 
those living in urban areas, with non-Aboriginal partners, and in smaller Aboriginal 
communities. 
Overall, Cairns feels parallelist discourses "[do] not address the reality of our 
interdependence, and of our intermingling. It speaks, therefore, to only part of who we 
are."111 The fundamental question that parallelist theories overlook is: "what will 
sustain our feelings of responsibility for each other?"112 If Aboriginal peoples 
continually stress that they have nothing in common with non-Aboriginal Canadians, 
Aboriginal peoples may, in Cairns' view, find little support for their interests and goals 
and should not be surprised if non-Aboriginal Canadians express an unwillingness to 
seek the reconciliation and healing necessary for greater solidarity and sharing to 
108
 Ibid., 113. 
109
 Ibid., 139. 
110
 Ibid., 75. 
111
 Ibid., 92. 
112
 Ibid., 155. 
46 
arise.113 He finds this highly problematic since Aboriginal peoples can benefit greatly 
from cooperation with non-Aboriginal Canadians, particularly given the tremendous 
political and economic influence they wield. This leads Cairns to conclude that 
parallelist discourses jeopardize the Aboriginal futures they aim to secure. Instead, he 
proposes that Aboriginal peoples should highlight the positive effects that solidarity 
with the wider community can have on their individual and collective futures. 
According to Cairns, we require a theory that adequately emphasizes the role that 
stronger moral bonds and greater solidarity can have in securing Aboriginal futures. In 
other words, we require a theory of common citizenship. 
Cairns believes that "citizens plus" addresses the shortcomings of assimilation 
and Aboriginal nationalism. First used in the 1966 Hawthorn Report,115 the concept of 
"citizens plus" recognizes Aboriginal difference and the complex interdependence 
among Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies. It suggests that Aboriginal peoples 
should place greater emphasis on their identity as Canadian "citizens" to ensure the 
wider community supports the "plus" dimension of Aboriginal citizenship, which 
preserves Aboriginal difference by recognizing Aboriginal rights based on cultural 
difference and historical priority.116 To help ensure that non-Aboriginal Canadians 
express empathy for Aboriginal rights and identities, Cairns urges Aboriginal peoples 
to embrace a shared identity and refrain from "insisting that every interaction with the 
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state be suffused with Aboriginally."117 In this way, Canadian citizenship can morally 
bind Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples together while giving each space to 
express their differences. 
Cairns is open to many forms of Aboriginal rights because he feels such rights 
must respond to the diverse needs of Canada's many Aboriginal communities. 
Nevertheless, in practical terms, he believes that limits exist as to how far Aboriginal 
peoples should push their rights. For example, his only mention of prior Aboriginal 
sovereignty suggests that "a workable compromise should recognize [Aboriginal and 
1 1 O 
non-Aboriginal sovereignty's] contradictory reality, but not be dominated by it." 
Likewise, we should support treaty rights, but their continual promotion "provide[s] 
little of the sustenance and fellow-feeling that the carrying out of the task of healing 
and rapprochement requires."119 Cairns similarly believes treaty negotiations and 
litigation falsely create the perception that we do not have common interests or 
values.120 
To his credit, Cairns acknowledges the difficulty many Aboriginal peoples have 
with the idea of a shared identity, and the resulting challenges of promoting solidarity 
and Aboriginal participation in the wider society. However, he feels there is no better 
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alternative even if Aboriginal peoples must, at least to some extent, compromise their 
unique rights and status as Aboriginal peoples.121 Cairns urges us to keep several 
factors in mind whenever "images of separate societies threaten to take hold of our 
imagination." First, Aboriginal peoples will continue to be members of both 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities. Second, Aboriginal peoples cannot 
ignore "the massive interdependence of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples in 
terms of culture, economy, and intermarriage."122 Finally, the non-Aboriginal-
dominated state has significant control over the resources needed for Aboriginal self-
determination and Cairns believes only a shared identity ensures Aboriginal peoples 
will be able to access the resources they need to address the terrible socio-economic 
conditions they face. 
Citizenship as Shared Identity and the Challenge of Overcoming Alienation 
"Citizens plus" should appeal to those who seek a theory that stresses the complexity of 
Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal interdependence and the resultant need for, and benefits of, 
solidarity. Yet, I propose that it is limited in its ability to address one of the most 
serious barriers to achieving solidarity: the deep sense of alienation and mistrust many 
Aboriginal peoples feel toward Canadian society. Although Cairns understands why 
many Aboriginal peoples feel alienated and have little trust in the Canadian state, his 
response to these concerns is in many ways inadequate. A serious gap exists between 
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Cairns' goal of establishing greater solidarity and his explanation of how a shared 
identity will get us there. 1 link his inability to overcome Aboriginal alienation to this 
reliance on a shared identity. In my view Cairns appears overly optimistic that 
Aboriginal peoples will voluntarily forget the past and overlook rights based upon 
treaties, their historical priority, and their sovereign status as self-determining peoples 
only to embrace a broader Canadian identity. 
To begin with, Cairns overestimates the degree to which the concept of 
"citizens plus" represents a break from Canada's troubling colonial history. In 
common with past assimilationist policies, "citizens plus" proposes that Aboriginal 
peoples should recognize the benefits of sacrificing their special rights and pursuing a 
shared identity with non-Aboriginal Canadians. Several historical examples highlight 
my concern.124 As early as 1857, Upper Canada unilaterally passed an act aiming to 
strip Aboriginal peoples of their distinctly Aboriginal rights. The preamble of An Act 
to Encourage the Gradual Civilization of the Indian Tribes in this Province effectively 
called for the removal of all legal distinctions between Aboriginal peoples and non-
Aboriginal peoples. It endeavoured to make Aboriginal peoples British subjects with 
identical rights and entitlements as settlers.125 It also occurred without consulting 
Aboriginal peoples who placed tremendous value on their distinctive rights, and who 
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understandably did not want non-Aboriginal peoples determining their rights and 
entitlements for them. It also falsely promised to assist Aboriginal peoples who were 
often separated from their lands and traditions. Over a century later, the federal 
government's 1969 White Paper on Indian policy126 also sought to eliminate 
Aboriginal rights without consulting Aboriginal peoples, again in the name of 
establishing common citizenship.127 It called for the abolition of the Indian Act, the 
dismantling of the Indian Affairs Branch, and the general eradication of institutions that 
sustained the separate treatment of Aboriginal peoples. The Aboriginal backlash was 
pronounced and led the Canadian government to retreat on the issue. 
Taiaiake Alfred discusses another more subtle example. Writing about the 
federal government granting Aboriginal peoples the identical voting rights as non-
Aboriginal Canadians in 1960, Alfred asks, 
has the citizenship legally forced on our people a generation ago 
helped get our land back, gain compassion for past injustices, or made 
our communities healthier? Of course it hasn't.... Forty years of 
citizenship and we're more assimilated now than ever before, and 
we're losing our languages and traditions at a heartbreaking rate. 
What citizenship has done over the years is undermine in people's 
minds the idea that we have a separate existence and distinct collective 
rights.128 
Alfred correctly observes that granting Aboriginal peoples identical voting rights 
creates the false impression that Aboriginal peoples (can) actively participate in, and 
influence, shared decisions. When the non-Aboriginal majority consistently votes 
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against Aboriginal interests even their right to participate can create the appearance that 
they agree with decisions that in fact run counter to their rights and interests. As I 
pointed out in the introduction to this thesis, Aboriginal peoples currently have little 
impact on electoral results and party platforms. Yet, successful (and overwhelmingly 
non-Aboriginal) candidates can misconstrue Aboriginal participation in elections as 
expressed support for their status as Canadian citizens, mandating them to act on behalf 
of Aboriginal constituents despite the fact that policies often do not resonate with 
Aboriginal peoples or support Aboriginal rights.129 It is therefore understandable that 
Aboriginal nationalists like Alfred distance themselves from non-Aboriginal politicians 
who feel they legitimately represent Aboriginal peoples and their interests. 
These historical examples illustrate the strong relationship between efforts to 
establish a shared citizenship and the elimination of Aboriginal rights - rights that 
sustain Aboriginal identities and difference. In all three cases, the cost of establishing a 
common citizenship and shared identity was one-sided; the state expected only 
Aboriginal peoples to abandon their special rights. Cairns acknowledges the injustices 
of our colonial past and would similarly condemn the historical examples in the 
preceding paragraph. He nevertheless suggests, though not as forcefully or in every 
instance, that it should again be Aboriginal peoples who consider foregoing some of 
their rights to cultivate a shared identity - including rights they consider vital for 
securing their status as self-determining peoples. Cairns believes that Aboriginal 
129
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peoples must often accept the inapplicability of their rights because provincial and 
federal governments have an unavoidable influence over their lives.130 Missing from 
Cairns' analysis is an explanation of why Aboriginal peoples should accept that the 
present situation leads to the erosion of their Aboriginal rights. For many, asking that 
they surrender their special rights seems like Canada's assimilationist history repeating 
itself.131 The risk of repeating this history and perpetuating colonial mentalities makes 
"citizens plus" an unlikely starting point for generating solidarity. 
It is also highly questionable whether non-Aboriginal support for the cultural 
and socio-economic needs of Aboriginal peoples will necessarily follow from a shared 
identity. The evidence is inconclusive as to whether a substantial link exists between a 
shared identity and support for marginalized citizens. Even strong advocates of a 
shared civic identity acknowledge that it does not guarantee a community where 
citizens support one another. For instance, Parekh states that "by and large a shared 
sense of common belonging leads to redistribution only when it is energized by a 
strong social conscience, and then much of the credit for the redistribution should given 
to the latter, the national identity playing only a limited motivational role."132 History 
has seen the full range of ideologies associated with a shared identity. For example, 
Britain's radical social cutbacks of the 1980s occurred when a shared British national 
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identity was its strongest in decades. Similarly, Americans tend to be highly 
patriotic but have some of the weakest redistributive programs in the industrialized 
world. In other words, no particular social, cultural, or economic assistance programs 
necessarily follow from a strongly shared identity.134 
Cairns might counter that adopting a shared identity gives Aboriginal peoples 
greater influence on the prevailing views of non-Aboriginal Canadians, though he 
offers little security that this will in fact happen. On the contrary, adopting a shared 
identity may even legitimize the erosion of their identities and rights. This risk exists, 
as Ken McRoberts and others point out, because at present the majority community (the 
locus of the shared identity) does not consider Canada to be a multinational society.135 
Some suggest that English-speaking Canadians and recent immigrants resent those who 
publically and strongly identify with minority nations.136 In such a climate, Aboriginal 
peoples have little assurance that non-Aboriginal Canadians will support special or 
differentiated rights once a shared identity comes into existence. Overall, the link 
between Aboriginal identification with Canada and non-Aboriginal support for 
Aboriginal rights and interests is dubious. If Aboriginal peoples put their faith in 
"citizens plus" and it leads to little or no change it is likely that their feelings of 
alienation and mistrust will only deepen. 
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Insisting on the need for a shared identity is also troubling because of the 
detrimental psychological effect it may have on Aboriginal views of Canada. 
Suggesting that unless Aboriginal peoples identify as Canadian they will receive less 
support reminds Aboriginal peoples of "who holds the leash and how long it is" instead 
of promoting any positive sense of commitment to Canada.137 Cairns seems to suggest 
that we cannot wait for normative arguments to convince the non-Aboriginal majority 
that Aboriginal peoples justly deserve a measure of power over their own affairs in 
various institutions including Canada's legislatures. Yet, the idea that Aboriginal 
peoples must cater to the majority to receive support reinforces the notion that they are, 
as Devlin and Dobrowolsky put it, "citizens supplicant" who are powerless and 
dependent on non-Aboriginal charity and good will. While I agree that they require 
state support, Aboriginal peoples frequently see support as an entitlement demanded by 
principles of justice. Construing support as charity helps non-Aboriginal Canadians 
deal with feelings of guilt stemming from our colonial past, but alienates Aboriginal 
peoples who insist that support represents fair compensation for past injustices such as 
lost access to land and other resources.139 As Cairns seems to suggest, support 
understood as charity helps address the situation from a non-Aboriginal perspective. I 
doubt many Aboriginal people would feel the same. 
One final point: Cairns largely avoids critical normative issues that many 
Aboriginal peoples feel Canadians must address for solidarity and trust to emerge -
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issues such as the implications of Aboriginal nationhood, self-determination, and prior 
sovereignty. He suggests that Aboriginal nationalists and legal scholars naively raise 
these issues in an attempt to return to a time when Aboriginal peoples did not rely on 
non-Aboriginal support, interpenetration was uncommon, and cultural differences were 
more evident.140 Now that the non-Aboriginal majority has effectively asserted control 
over Canada, Cairns feels Aboriginal peoples must accept and work towards their goals 
accepting that Canadian institutions govern over most of their affairs. However, rather 
than seeking a normative justification for the imposition of Canadian sovereignty over 
Aboriginal peoples, Cairns instead accuses Aboriginal nationalists of being unrealistic 
in their wish to preserve their sovereign status as self-determining peoples with 
distinctive rights and identities. For many Aboriginal nationalists, Cairns' explanation 
is not only insufficient, but also misunderstands what they are trying to bring to light. 
As Murphy suggests, 
the normative dimension of Aboriginal nationalism tells us why we 
should do something, not what we should do.... It speaks just as 
easily to Metis, urban or landless populations as it does to land-based 
communities whose varied needs, circumstances, and characteristics 
will require vastly different institutional solutions, but whose claims 
all proceed from the common normative foundation provided by 
historic and unceded Aboriginal sovereignty.141 
If Murphy is right, and I suspect he is, Cairns fundamentally misunderstands 
Aboriginal nationalist theories and perspectives. Aboriginal nationalists generally 
recognize the impossibility of returning to parallel societies that do not overlap or 
experience interdependence. Moreover, they themselves suggest practical ways of 
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addressing their normative concerns that consider non-Aboriginal sovereignty, 
Aboriginal dependency, and complex interdependence. Contrary to Cairns, however, 
they resist the one-sided idea that Aboriginal peoples must put their rights on hold. 
"Citizens plus" clearly attempts to bypass the normative concerns of Aboriginal 
peoples by suggesting that a shared identity offers more in the way of practical 
benefits. If this is true, we should consider supporting Cairns. However, given the 
possibility that alternative solutions exist that show greater consideration for the 
normative concerns of Aboriginal peoples143 it is understandable that many are not 
prepared to accept the cost associated with embracing a shared identity. 
"Citizens plus" struggles to promote Aboriginal participation in shared 
institutions because it struggles to overcome Aboriginal feelings of alienation and 
mistrust. It caters to the powerful non-Aboriginal majority by suggesting Aboriginal 
peoples must sometimes subordinate their national identities and adopt a shared civic 
identity. However, generating solidarity and trust is more fundamentally about 
Aboriginal peoples sincerely feeling a sense of common commitment to Canada. Many 
will not see their membership in Canada as legitimate unless it breaks with the past, 
addresses their needs, treats them as equals, and respects their distinct rights and 
identities as members of Aboriginal nations. Suggesting a shared identity should exist 
where alienation and mistrust currently exist misplaces the priority because it 
misunderstands the sentiments of many Aboriginal peoples towards our past, their 
142
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rights, and possible solutions to help us move forward. The next section suggests an 
alternative basis for establishing common citizenship and solidarity that avoids calling 
for a shared identity. 
Generating Solidarity and Trust: The Psychological Dimension of Citizenship 
Given that "citizens plus" pushes many Aboriginal peoples away from the idea of 
shared citizenship, encouraging greater Aboriginal participation in shared institutions 
requires another approach. This section begins by looking at an alternative basis for 
shared citizenship proposed by Melissa Williams called "citizenship as shared fate." 
Williams agrees with Cairns' view that Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples have 
little choice but to participate together in shared state institutions. She nevertheless 
rejects "citizens plus" and other forms of shared citizenship that rely on a sense of 
shared identity instead of promoting the full recognition of Aboriginal nationhood. 
Like Cairns and Williams, I cannot overemphasize the importance of Aboriginal 
participation in Canadian institutions. I also share Williams' criticism of Cairns' 
"citizens plus" and the strong possibility that it pushes many Aboriginal peoples even 
further away. However, I suggest that "citizenship as shared fate" similarly struggles 
to tell us how Aboriginal interests will receive fair treatment within shared institutions 
should Aboriginal peoples participate for primarily instrumental reasons. In answering 
this challenge, I reaffirm and reinforce Cairns' argument that finding mutually 
acceptable solutions is problematic without some sense of inter-communal solidarity 
and trust. Yet, since Cairns' shared identity is often out of the question, I conclude that 
we must find alternative ways of generating solidarity so that Aboriginal peoples feel 
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that participating in shared institutions is consistent with their rights, values, and 
identities. 
Williams generally agrees with Cairns' conclusion as to why Aboriginal 
peoples should participate in shared institutions. Williams and Cairns believe that 
practical imperatives facing Aboriginal peoples compel us to make significant changes 
to Canadian institutions that encourage Aboriginal participation. 4 Like Cairns, 
Williams also believes there is "no plausible alternative to living together." 5 While 
Aboriginal peoples have a right to self-government, this sort of autonomy will not give 
them full control over all decisions that affect their goals and interests. Williams 
also clearly believes that the state needs to find ways of encouraging Aboriginal 
participation in shared institutions because fundamental principles of democratic 
legitimacy demand it. Such principles demand that Aboriginal peoples affected by 
Canadian democratic institutions require a voice within those institutions. As Williams 
writes, "the concept of citizenship expresses the idea that human freedom requires 
some agency over the political structures that shape our lives and that we can exercise 
agency only as participants in a collective project."147 This explains why Williams and 
Cairns disagree with prominent Aboriginal theorists, such as Alfred and Monture-
Angus, who reject the idea of shared citizenship altogether and, in the process, seem to 
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accept the risk of cutting Aboriginal peoples off from important institutions affecting 
their lives.148 Monture-Angus, for instance, states that 
the descendents of the settler nations [non-Aboriginal Canadians] have 
their laws and beliefs, their institutions. These things will be kept on 
the Canadian path. Canadian people have their own way of doing 
things and they have the right to be that way.... It is parallel to the 
right to be a Mohawk woman, which is in fact the only right I have. 
Those paths do not become one. Nowhere have my people ever 
agreed to live governed by Canadian laws or Canadian ways of 
thinking or being. Nor have my people tried to change the way 
Canadians govern themselves. That is our respect for Canadian rights. 
This is the place where my people wish to remain.149 
Williams and Cairns clearly differ from Monture-Angus, feeling that Aboriginal 
peoples cannot avoid sharing institutions with non-Aboriginal Canadians without great 
cost to Aboriginal interests and aims. 
Yet Williams also differs from Cairns, and agrees with Alfred and Monture-
Angus, in her view that Aboriginal peoples should not accept a form of citizenship that 
presupposes a shared identity with non-Aboriginal Canadians. Her position is 
innovative because she supports shared citizenship and rejects the need for shared 
identity. Aboriginal peoples are entitled to participate in shared institutions that 
politically recognize their distinct identities. However, for Williams, recognition does 
not demand that Aboriginal peoples work to promote solidarity and trust with the wider 
community.150 On the contrary, it means simply getting on with business, despite our 
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differences, in a manner that respects the legitimate interests of Aboriginal peoples. 
Even if Aboriginal peoples do not value coexistence we should endeavour to treat one 
another justly, in the sense that the legitimacy of our actions should depend on whether 
we can justify them to those affected in terms they can understand. It therefore follows 
that the legitimacy of the Canadian state and its actions depends on its cultivation of 
just relations with Aboriginal peoples as much as the legitimacy of Aboriginal actions 
depends on how they treat the larger society.151 Williams' "citizenship as shared fate" 
essentially creates a foundation upon which Aboriginal peoples can use various 
political channels, including shared institutions, to hold the state accountable without 
compromising their status as distinctive nations or peoples. This runs counter to 
Cairns' belief that Aboriginal peoples at times need to put their Aboriginal identities 
and values aside to cultivate positive ties with the wider community. 
Though Williams suggests that normative principles and practical imperatives 
on their own can sufficiently lead to such recognition, I sense that without solidarity 
and trust such measures are unlikely to transform Canadian society in positive ways. 
Starting with norms, we are more likely to interpret the normative claims of others 
favourably where a sense of trust and obligation already exists.152 As Callan argues, "if 
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trust is weak, then we will be inclined to interpret the judgments of those who disagree 
with us, rightly or wrongly, as instances of unreasonable pluralism, and the 
compromise and moderation appropriate to justice will likely be blocked." For 
example, on Canada's east coast the Mi'kmaq and Canadian governments dispute 
jurisdiction over the salmon fishery. Both sides appeal to their unique normative 
arguments for exercising sole jurisdiction and choose to ignore the other's claims. 
Normative appeals alone fail to bring the two sides together to resolve this important 
issue.154 Canadian governments are reluctant to deal with the Mi'kmaq people as a 
nation even though clear links exist and appeals for justice have been made. Many of 
Canada's leading scholars believe that this type of situation pervades Aboriginal/non-
Aboriginal relations more generally.155 It seems that it would not be an understatement 
to suggest that, given the deep sense of mistrust that exists between many Aboriginal 
peoples and the state, normative arguments have done little to effect change in the 
name of justice. 
Williams seems to believe that the practical imperatives arising from our shared 
fate may also lead non-Aboriginal Canadians to support change. The idea that 
practical imperatives promote a desire for change has considerable merit and is 
therefore worth exploring. Consider the case of Northern Ireland where bloodshed 
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forced its Catholic-republican and Protestant-unionist communities to recognize that 
they coexist within a community of shared fate. Because little trust exists between the 
two sides, the 1998 Belfast Agreement created the shared-rule Northern Ireland 
Assembly - a quasi-constitutional institution - where ironclad guarantees ensure that 
neither side can silence or subordinate the other.157 Appeals for justice alone did not 
lead to the Agreement. Instead, the mutual desire to halt the violence in both 
communities served as a strong motivating factor. The practical imperatives facing 
Canada are similar, although the suffering gets less attention because it is generally not 
as violent and is much more one-sided. Aboriginal communities experience much 
higher suicide rates, infant mortality rates, and other factors leading to a life expectancy 
that is on average approximately seven years shorter than that of the general 
population.158 In just the last twenty years violent conflicts in Oka, Ipperwash, and 
Gustafsen Lake have led to injuries and deaths in Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
communities. In other cases conflict avoided bloodshed but caused serious socio-
economic hardship. The Burnt Church Crisis between Mi'kmaq and non-Aboriginal 
peoples over the local lobster fishery led to the destruction of fishing equipment in both 
communities, leaving the Mi'kmaq with an insufficient number of traps to allow the 
entire community to fish for lobster. Many Aboriginal peoples feel powerless to 
address these terrible, and often shocking, living conditions. Clearly, reasons exist for 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples to support institutions that can help resolve 
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these issues. Unfortunately, it appears these problems will continue to linger without 
feelings of solidarity acting as a catalyst for the necessary change to occur. 
As evidence, I believe it is useful to return to the case of Northern Ireland. The 
effectiveness of the Northern Ireland Assembly frequently waxes and wanes. In fact, it 
has been suspended more than it has been sitting since its latest inception 
approximately ten years ago. Experts on the topic attribute this inability to function 
adequately on a regular basis to a lack of inter-communal trust. 5 One scholar 
suggests that agreements such as the Belfast Agreement "are essential to protect 
sustainable social relationships but without adequate relationships beyond formal 
agreements all proposed political structures are threatened by the legacy of violent 
conflict...social stability needs political structures and political structures need social 
stability."160 Another worries that the prospects for serious change are low. The 
weapons remain (albeit hidden from view) and signs of cooperation and trust are 
difficult to find.161 To some extent, the institutional recognition of the minority 
Catholic-republican community itself has improved trust as members of this 
community feel their voices are heard and the Protestant-unionist majority feels lasting 
peace is within reach. I interpret Williams as holding hope for such an outcome in 
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Canada.1 Unfortunately, the vast power imbalance seems to limit this possibility. 
Given this particular strong imbalance, normative arguments and practical imperatives 
only help to identify and explain the problems instead of leading to positive changes 
that promote effective Aboriginal representation in shared decision-making.164 
Recognizing interdependence and the strength of these arguments cannot on its own 
lead to necessary changes in Canadian political institutions. Again, solidarity and trust 
a key component missing from Williams' approach. 
Increasingly, many theorists reinforce the need for solidarity and trust, 
suggesting that establishing solidarity and trust requires looking at the psychological 
dimension of shared citizenship. Joseph Carens argues that "[one] way to belong to a 
political community is to feel that one belongs, to be connected to it through one's 
sense of emotional attachment, identification, and loyalty."165 Catering to this 
dimension does not require a shared identity as such, but some form of positive mutual 
identification with the state and its institutions. Unlike a shared identity, mutual 
identification means that everyone can see themselves as represented by shared 
institutions even if we have different identities or values. Much like the existence of 
multiple political parties might give different classes of society a sense that their 
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Indigenous Youth: Charting the Course for Youth Democratic and Political Participation (Ottawa: 
Canadian Policy Research Networks, 2007), 14. They conclude that "the identification of [practical 
imperatives] is continually supported in lieu of any concentrated effort for other strategies." In other 
words, it is much easier to get all sides to identify the problem than to get all sides to begin 
addressing the problem. 
Carens, "Dimensions of Citizenship," 113. Emphasis added. 
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perspectives and class identities are affirmed by legislatures, so too do our institutions 
need to do the same for national differences. As Borrows maintains, 
citizenship must also take into account the varied self-perceptions 
people hold within communities, and these views must sometimes 
mingle to create common understandings and a larger vision of who 
we are as fellow citizens.... Citizenship in the state must begin to 
develop an interactive reciprocity on certain matters of vital concern 
and address the more subjective elements of who people 'feel they are' 
in relation to others in society. 
Borrows appears to suggest that Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal identities are important 
because those who hold them feel they are important. We must therefore not only 
promote mutual recognition, but mutual respect for the sentiments of our fellow 
citizens. 
In practice, such respect means sincerely attempting to avoid coercing, 
subordinating or excluding Aboriginal peoples. Since mistrust tempts us to revert to 
one-sided arguments and intransigence, leading to deadlock or even violence, we 
should place value in each other's interests because they matter to those who hold 
them.167 In Canada, this means governments should not reject Aboriginal nationhood 
outright on normative or practical grounds for the reason that it means something to 
Aboriginal peoples. Similarly, Aboriginal peoples should recognize the legitimacy of 
non-Aboriginal interests that have emerged since contact because they matter to non-
Aboriginal Canadians. 
It is also important to recognize that we cannot avoid making tough decisions 
when Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests conflict. Some Aboriginal nationalists 
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very cautiously agree that Aboriginal peoples should sometimes forego their rights in 
order to build solidarity and trust with non-Aboriginal Canadians.168 On the surface, 
this may appear to agree with Cairns' position. However, Cairns tends to believe that 
Aboriginal peoples must primarily, or even solely, make the sacrifice when Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal rights come into conflict because it is Aboriginal peoples who need 
to establish favour with the non-Aboriginal majority. I believe this position risks 
pushing many Aboriginal peoples away. It also makes it easier to understand 
Aboriginal caution on the matter, which arises from the feeling that non-Aboriginal 
Canadians may not make any meaningful sacrifices at all. Cairns' mistaken position is 
further evident in his analysis of Borrows' work. Cairns believes, as I do, that 
Borrows' work represents a refreshing middle ground that promotes Aboriginal 
participation in existing Canadian institutions.169 However, he misses a crucial element 
in Borrows' message: Aboriginal peoples should genuinely embrace shared citizenship 
as long as it does not require subordinating their rights and identities as members of 
Aboriginal communities.170 When only Aboriginal peoples are expected to forego their 
rights, we should not be surprised when they resist shared citizenship. However, if a 
more delicate balance were struck whereby non-Aboriginal Canadians also forewent 
their rights we might see greater Aboriginal willingness to consider what Cairns feels is 
necessary in the way of Aboriginal peoples surrendering their rights. It might involve 
non-Aboriginal Canadians surrendering any say on the content of Aboriginal curricula 
168
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in public schools or accepting a ban on hunting or fishing certain species in decline that 
are of extreme importance to Aboriginal peoples. Unless the rights limitation is 
mutual, we cannot expect the relationship to move forward and we certainly cannot 
expect trust to develop. 
On the other hand, if we initiate changes that respect everyone involved we may 
generate the mutual feelings needed for relationships based on solidarity and trust to 
emerge and for effective shared citizenship to take hold. To begin with, the state might 
consider sincerely supporting Aboriginal self-government as an initial step towards 
generating trust. Harty and Murphy highlight this possibility, believing support for 
self-government has particular relevance to situations where low levels of trust persist. 
In many cases, it may be that the only viable option is first to establish 
autonomous institutions of self-government.... The idea here is that 
the self-governing institutions will provide the community in question 
with a sense of security which might provide a platform upon which 
sufficient inter-communal trust can be established that might in turn 
support cooperation in a second layer of shared-rule institutions.171 
Unfortunately, Canadian governments generally underemphasize the role support for 
self-government can play in building trust, instead choosing to look at it more as a cost 
than an opportunity. 7 Support for self-government shows Aboriginal peoples that the 
state respects their interests by giving them an opportunity to reclaim control over their 
lives and participate alongside non-Aboriginal people as equals. It helps many 
Aboriginal peoples feel empowered to enter equal and "genuine relations of reciprocity 
171
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and sharing" alongside the wider community. When seen as an initial step towards 
inclusion into the broader society, self-government helps overcome the inherent risks 
Aboriginal peoples feel that they take when participating in shared institutions. We 
nevertheless must not stop here. As mentioned in previous chapters, many Aboriginal 
peoples do not see self-government as a step towards inclusion, but towards isolation. 
Some believe that self-government promises to give Aboriginal peoples full control 
over their lives so that they no longer rely on non-Aboriginal Canadians and 
communities. In other words, they strive for a future where they send their children to 
Aboriginal schools, see Aboriginal doctors, and govern the environment and resources 
of a discrete Aboriginal territory. Cairns raises this concern, citing the final Report of 
the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples as a case where minimal attention was 
paid to shared institutions.174 His point is valid, even if he overstates the degree to 
which Aboriginal peoples as a whole dismiss shared institutions.175 I take this concern 
as a sign that we must do more than simply promote self-government. 
Finally, indigenizing shared institutions can help build trust and may make 
participation in shared institutions more palatable for many Aboriginal peoples. 
Indigenization involves introducing Aboriginal symbols and traditions alongside state 
Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, vol. 1(3). 
Cairns, Citizens Plus, 148-149, 244nl77. 
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by special representation for First Nations in Parliament. Nevertheless, the situation of Indian 
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Fleras, "From Social Control towards Political Self-Determination? Maori Seats and the Politics of 
Separate Maori Representation in New Zealand," Canadian Journal of Political Science 18, no. 3 
(1985): 574. 
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symbols such as our flags, anthems, head of state, and national holidays. As theorists 
increasingly argue, multinational states cannot remain neutral on these fronts and 
should find ways of publicly promoting all of their constituent national communities. 
Since the state cannot remain entirely neutral among its national communities, respect 
for Aboriginal identities requires that we incorporate indigenous symbols, practices, 
and voices in our shared civic life and shared institutions. 
One prominent solution, currently practiced in New Zealand, is guaranteed 
Aboriginal representation. In legislatures all across Canada a lack of Aboriginal voices 
persists, reinforcing Aboriginal alienation and mistrust towards what they feel are 
exclusionary and ineffective institutions.177 Guaranteed representation helps address 
this problem. Guaranteed Aboriginal representation can help even the most alienated 
Aboriginal communities feel comfortable with the idea of participating in shared 
institutions. As Ladner concludes, 
[guaranteed representation] would enable Aboriginal people to 
participate in Canadian electoral politics as nations and to vote as, and 
for, citizens of their nations. [It] could liberate Aboriginal people from 
the forces of assimilation, as individuals would not be forced to 
participate in the alien system as "Canadians." Instead, they could 
participate as members of their nations and in a manner that could be 
designed to incorporate Aboriginal peoples as "nations within."178 
Ladner implies that even in the most alienated Aboriginal communities, Aboriginal 
participation in shared institutions can arise if reforms consider Aboriginal feelings. 
One recent empirical study of Aboriginal youth on the subject suggests that they wish 
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to reconcile Aboriginal nationhood with Canadian citizenship, but feel excluded and 
have little trust in the political parties and politicians that presently 'represent' them. 179 
Most Aboriginal youth ultimately desire ways of being included - of participating in 
elections and shared institutions - that support their values, traditions, and identities. 
Conclusion 
Given our complex and irreversible interdependence, we clearly require a theory of 
shared citizenship that empowers Aboriginal peoples within shared Canadian 
institutions that affect their lives. Cairns' theory of "citizens plus" provides a strong 
foundation upon which Aboriginal peoples can participate because it tackles our 
colonialist legacy, recognizes Aboriginal difference, and emphasizes that this must be 
done with our interdependence in mind. Cairns rightfully feels these aspects of 
"citizens plus" can encourage greater solidarity between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal peoples. In particular, his theory gains much of its strength over 
Kymlicka's because of its recognition of how Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples 
are complexly interdependent in socio-economic, geographic, and certainly political 
terms. Yet, I have argued that his reliance on a shared identity to achieve solidarity is 
highly problematic from the point of view of many Aboriginal peoples. Instead of 
promoting Aboriginal participation, it pushes many Aboriginal peoples further away 
from shared citizenship and shared institutions. 
Like Cairns, Williams adequately acknowledges the political importance of our 
interdependence and the need for Aboriginal participation in shared institutions. 
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Unlike Cairns, she does not propose that Aboriginal peoples adopt a shared identity. 
This is crucial because, without demanding a shared identity, Aboriginal peoples can 
participate on their own terms, seeing themselves solely as members of Aboriginal 
nations if they wish. Participating in this way avoids the significant risk of pushing 
Aboriginal peoples away from participating in shared institutions - a serious 
consequence that exists within Cairns' theory. As I interpret Williams, she believes 
that the normative and practical imperatives of the relationship between Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal peoples will promote mutually agreeable arrangements. For example, 
the need to right historical wrongs will lead to positive change, or the desire to end the 
terrible socio-economic conditions faced by Aboriginal peoples will prompt all 
Canadians to act in proper proportion to the problem. Ultimately, Williams' 
"citizenship as shared fate" lacks a convincing explanation of how Aboriginal interests 
will sufficiently influence shared-decisions should Aboriginal peoples participate for 
primarily instrumental reasons, without any feelings of solidarity and trust. In response 
to this problem, I have suggested that finding mutually acceptable solutions requires 
that we find concrete ways of generating inter-communal feelings of solidarity and 
trust. Yet, we cannot rely, as does Cairns, on a shared identity to generate these 
feelings as it pushes many Aboriginal peoples further away from non-Aboriginal 
Canadians and the Canadian state. Therefore, I conclude that we must rely other ways 
of promoting solidarity and trust without demanding that Aboriginal peoples adopt a 
shared identity. 
It is not easy to find solutions that strike a delicate balance between avoiding a 
shared identify and promoting trust and mutual identification with shared institutions. I 
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have suggested that recent attention to the psychological dimension of citizenship helps 
in this regard. It involves promoting a sense of mutual respect for the rights, identities 
and values of others. It also entails respect for how Aboriginal peoples feel they relate 
to other members of society and its shared institutions. I have briefly outlined some 
solutions in this chapter, such as promoting Aboriginal self-government and the idea of 
indigenizing Canadian institutions. In each case, Aboriginal values, identities, and 
interests would have a stronger footing in Canadian society, positively affirming 
Aboriginal self-perceptions and hopefully building solidarity and trust as a result. The 
next chapter takes a deeper look at reforms that seek a delicate balance between 
including Aboriginal peoples in shared decision-making while recognizing their equal 
place in Canadian society and avoiding the need for a shared identity. 
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Chapter Three: From Alienation to Participation? Institutional Reform 
Considered 
I have so far suggested that although many Aboriginal peoples express ambivalence or 
even outright hostility towards Canadian institutions, for the foreseeable future 
Aboriginal self-determination requires participation alongside non-Aboriginal 
Canadians in shared institutions. As argued throughout this thesis, complex 
interdependence and the limited capacity of Aboriginal communities ensure that 
decisions made in Canadian institutions will continue to affect the lives of Aboriginal 
peoples on-reserve, off-reserve, in urban centres, and even in more remote areas. 
Moreover, as one Inuit organization aptly stated, "representation of the Aboriginal 
peoples in central institutions of Canada is an extension of our right to self-
determination within the federation."180 I have also suggested that the legitimacy of 
Canadian institutions depends on cultivating Aboriginal participation so that shared 
decisions genuinely consider their interests and values. Yet Aboriginal peoples are, 
with good reason, suspicious of sharing institutions with those who have historically 
undermined their rights and interests in favour of assimilation and subordination. 
Canadians should therefore feel obligated to seek reforms that address the deep sense 
of alienation and mistrust many Aboriginal peoples feel. To do this we need to 
consider changes that help Aboriginal peoples feel that common Canadian institutions 
are both effective and legitimate. 
Robert Milen, "Aboriginal Constitutional and Electoral Reform," in Aboriginal Peoples and 
Electoral Reform in Canada, ed. Robert A. Milen (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991), 19. This 
sentiment was echoed by many other Aboriginal groups cited in Milen's research. 
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This chapter offers suggestions aimed at overcoming Aboriginal feelings of 
alienation and mistrust, as discussed at length in Chapter Two, in ways that speak to the 
unavoidable interdependence and tremendous Aboriginal diversity raised in Chapter 
One. I begin by studying two important dimensions that can potentially improve 
Aboriginal participation in shared institutions: interests and symbolism. With these 
dimensions in mind, I then critically assess the theoretical and practical challenges and 
merits of 1) guaranteed Aboriginal representation in Canadian legislatures, 2) co-
management boards, and 3) indigenizing shared institutions. Whenever possible I use 
empirical examples to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of each option, including 
New Zealand's experience with guaranteed Maori seats and Canada's experience with 
co-management boards. The conclusion contends that such initiatives can improve on 
the status quo, in the process building inter-communal solidarity and establishing a 
sense of shared Canadian citizenship that gives Aboriginal peoples a place respectful of 
their status as nations. 
Interests. Symbolism, and Aboriginal Participation 
The limited role shared institutions presently play in promoting Aboriginal interests 
represents a significant barrier to Aboriginal participation. Like non-Aboriginal 
Canadians, Aboriginal peoples expect representatives to understand them, promote 
their values, and give them a voice. In the 1960s, when Canada first extended the 
franchise to Aboriginal peoples, many tried to elect representatives they felt could fill 
these important roles. When Aboriginal participation failed to lead to the election of 
Aboriginal representatives or sufficient concern for Aboriginal issues, Aboriginal 
75 
participation rates fell dramatically.181 Many Aboriginal peoples do not vote because 
they feel they have little impact on who wins elections and whether representatives 
speak on their behalf.182 The results are proof enough. Today, nearly half a century 
later, provincial legislatures average less than one Aboriginal representative each with 
many having none. Similar numbers exist federally where the maximum number of 
self-identifying Aboriginal Members of Parliament has never exceeded four with no 
more than two coming from south of the 60th parallel.183 Moreover, non-Aboriginal 
representatives on the whole, and despite even the best of intentions, have not done a 
satisfactory job of promoting Aboriginal values and speaking for Aboriginal 
constituents. Whether non-Aboriginal representatives struggle to understand and 
represent Aboriginal perspectives or feel bound to the non-Aboriginal majority that 
elected them, the results have led many Aboriginal peoples to conclude that, overall, 
the electoral status quo does not work for them.184 One Aboriginal organization made 
the need for Aboriginal representatives clear when speaking to a Royal Commission on 
the subject: 
We need members of Parliament who do not have to be taught who we 
are, what we want, and why we are important to this country. We 
need our people in Parliament in greater numbers than is possible 
under the power or influence that our votes are reduced to... . In other 
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words to perpetuate the current electoral system is in effect to make a 
mockery of our right to vote and to condemn our people to the politics 
of the majority. 
Scholars typically point to other factors when explaining the progression of Aboriginal 
rights over the past half century. For instance, to explain the successful opposition to 
the federal government's assimilationist 1969 White Paper, the recognition of their 
inherent self-government rights, and the establishment of the British Columbia Treaty 
Commission, some suggest Canadian courts have prodded reluctant Canadian 
governments to support Aboriginal rights and interests.186 Others feel global forces 
pressured Canadian governments to support domestic change.187 Few point to 
Aboriginal influence in shared institutions.188 Until we reform shared institutions so 
that Aboriginal peoples can participate effectively, we should not be surprised when 
Aboriginal peoples instead choose to pressure Canadian legislators through alternative 
avenues. 
Encouraging Aboriginal participation also depends in large part on the state's 
willingness to address symbolic concerns raised by numerous and diverse Aboriginal 
communities. One need not dig deep into the literature to see the many reasons why 
Aboriginal peoples feel symbolically alienated from Canadian institutions. Many feel 
that non-Aboriginal Canadians, and legislators, could easily interpret Aboriginal 
participation as approval for past (and possible future) assimilationist policies that have 
Quoted in Milen, "Aboriginal Constitutional and Electoral Reform," 40. 
Michael Murphy, "Culture and the Courts: A New Direction in Canadian Jurisprudence on 
Aboriginal Rights?," Canadian Journal of Political Science 34, no.l (2001): 109-129; Macklem, 
"Normative Dimensions"; and, Borrows, "Uncertain Citizens," 15-41. 
For a discussion of this issue, see Chapter Two. 
Some examples do exist, and are discussed later in this chapter. 
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marginalized and oppressed them and their communities.189 They contend that 
participation legitimizes fundamentally colonial institutions and detracts from other 
important goals, such as greater Aboriginal autonomy.190 In a recent study one 
Aboriginal youth states, "I haven't voted, mostly because I don't believe in the colonial 
style of government." 91 If we address these symbolic concerns we might find that not 
all Aboriginal peoples who refuse to participate necessarily reject Canadian citizenship. 
They may wish to identify as Canadian, but feel our shared institutions presently 
struggle to affirm in a positive way - and even go against - their identity as members 
of Aboriginal nations.192 In other words, deciding whether to participate is not always 
an easy choice. Other Aboriginal peoples simply feel participation in Canadian 
institutions is inappropriate, or view it as meddling in the affairs of another independent 
nation - an independence they themselves lost in the wake of colonization.193 
Why is it helpful to explore these concerns from a symbolic perspective? How 
should we approach symbolic change? Theorists tend to spend most of their efforts 
studying how Aboriginal peoples can gain a measure of political and economic - not 
Ladner, "The Alienation of Nation," 23. 
Anna Hunter, "Exploring the Issues of Aboriginal Representation in Federal Elections," Electoral 
Insight 5, no. 3 (2003): 30; Caillou, "Urban Indians," 235; and, Lander, "The Alienation of Nation," 
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this to be Borrows' message in Recovering Canada, though Borrows appears more optimistic that 
participation will change the system as opposed to the idea that changing the system must occur 
before meaningful participation can flourish. Of course, changing the system will not work if 
Aboriginal peoples do not agree with Borrows that they need to make participation in Canadian 
institutions a priority at some point. 
Knight, "Electoral Justice," 1092; Alfred et al., "The Meaning of Participation for Indigenous 
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They are all foreign nations." 
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symbolic - control over their lives. Some might even suggest that a focus on 
symbolism echoes of tokenism and detracts from these more pressing concerns. Yet 
state symbols play an important role in forming and maintaining public identification 
with shared institutions, often serving as "traffic lights" signalling boundaries between 
those who belong and those who do not.194 Public symbols are not fixed, and attitudes 
towards them vary both across and within national groups. For Aboriginal individuals 
and communities to have positive feelings towards shared institutions they must feel 
that they can define and recognize themselves within them. Like non-Aboriginal 
Canadians, "they expect some consistency between their private identities and the 
symbolic contents upheld by public authorities, embedded in the societal institutions, 
and celebrated in public events. Otherwise, Aboriginal individuals feel like social 
strangers; they feel that the society is not their society."195 Leaders in Northern Ireland 
understood the need for identification with societal institutions, and the 1998 Belfast 
agreement explicitly discusses symbolism's importance. It reads: "All participants 
acknowledge the sensitivity of the use of symbols and emblems for public purposes, 
and the need in particular in creating the new institutions to ensure that such symbols 
and emblems are used in a manner which promotes mutual respect rather than 
division."196 It would be a mistake to underestimate the ability of public symbols -
John Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1982), 7. 
Raymond Breton, "The Production and allocation of symbolic resources: an analysis of the linguistic 
and ethnocultural fields in Canada," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 21, no. 2 
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such as flags, anthems, and statutory holidays - to confer status and signal respect for 
some and not others. 
Canada has undertaken significant symbolic reforms in the past, which provide 
valuable examples that help us understand how we should approach the subject. The 
1960s saw Quebec nationalists express their lack of identification with central political 
institutions. The response by Canadian politicians led to various institutional reforms 
aimed at making public institutions more sensitive to French-Canada: a Royal 
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1963), the Official Languages Act 
(1969), and a new Canadian flag to replace the British Red Ensign design (1965).197 
On the other hand, these changes made many Canadians feel a sense of institutional 
unfamiliarity, anxiety, and even loss. Some even claimed that such reforms set the 
1 08 
stage for French domination within Canadian society. While such views are 
extreme, many Canadians sympathized with the questions symbolic change raised for 
Canada's future. As Breton correctly suggests, 
restructuring the symbolic order to make it easier for certain social 
segments to identify with its institutions could alienate and antagonize 
those accustomed to a sense of cultural dominance, and thus could put 
in motion an opposing set of forces that could destroy the new 
symbolic edifice.1 9 
Perhaps worse, he also expresses concern that it can jeopardize the material interests of 
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We must therefore approach symbolic change with a great deal of caution if we 
are to reap its benefits. As we look at changes meant to improve Aboriginal/non-
Aboriginal relations, we must consider whether any given change jeopardizes the entire 
project or harmfully spills over into other areas. History shows us that when 
Aboriginal peoples fight for their rights, the non-Aboriginal majority responds. For 
instance, introducing co-jurisdiction over fisheries could anger non-Aboriginal fishing 
communities, potentially leading either side to take action against the other - or to 
jeopardize fish stocks. In other words, we therefore should consider not only 
Aboriginal interests, rights, and sentiments, but also those of non-Aboriginal Canadians 
given our complex interdependence. Furthermore, in the case of Aboriginal peoples, 
symbolic reforms need to consider their diversity and various symbolic concerns. With 
these observations on the importance of impact and symbolism in mind, the next 
section looks at the first of three institutional reforms: Aboriginal electoral districts. 
Reform # 1: Aboriginal Electoral Districts 
According to at least one researcher, support for guaranteed Aboriginal electoral 
districts (AEDs) dates back over a century to Louis Riel. Over the past thirty-odd 
years various Canadian governments and many different Aboriginal organizations have 
shown interest in the idea.202 Most advocates of AEDs support guaranteed seats 
proportional to the percentage of self-identifying Aboriginal peoples within Canada. 
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Proportionality means that 3.8% (or about twelve) of the seats in the House of 
Commons would become AEDs given that the most recent census shows 3.8% of 
Canadians self-identify as Aboriginal. Similarly in Saskatchewan, where 14.9% of 
residents identify as Aboriginal, nine of the provincial legislature's fifty-eight seats 
would become AEDs. Such logic easily extends to other provinces.204 Scholars also 
typically support the idea that Aboriginal peoples could vote in standard electoral 
districts, but not in both types of districts for any given election.205 
This section promotes AEDs for two fundamental reasons. First, AEDs send 
Aboriginal peoples a powerful symbolic message that they can participate in shared 
decision-making without compromising their strongly held Aboriginal identities, rights, 
and values. They help overcome psychological barriers to participation such as 
Aboriginal feelings that participating in shared Canadian institutions comes with many 
risks, including assimilation. Second, AEDs help Aboriginal peoples gain much 
needed influence over shared decisions that invariably affect them and their 
communities. Recall that complex interdependence ensures that Canadian jurisdictions 
affect Aboriginal peoples on most issues such as the environment, health care, 
education, transportation, and social services.206 By introducing AEDs in Canadian 
legislatures, Aboriginal peoples can counteract non-Aboriginal dominance, albeit with 
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some limits and challenges. Although AEDs on their own cannot ensure that shared 
institutions always fairly promote Aboriginal interests in every instance, they do 
promise a greater balance in shared decision-making - something necessary given our 
complex interdependence. The overall idea is that AEDs make it easier for Aboriginal 
peoples to participate in shared institutions, promote their interests, and even, over 
time, build feelings of inter-communal solidarity and trust. 
At the symbolic level, AEDs help Aboriginal peoples overcome psychological 
hurdles toward participating in electoral politics and shared institutions. Many 
Aboriginal individuals reject participating in Canadian elections because they feel there 
is a risk that non-Aboriginal Canadians might interpret it as support for the very 
Canadian institutions (and policies) that have historically marginalized their rights and 
interests. AEDs, on the other hand, can make participation more palatable for those 
who reject Canadian citizenship by allowing them to participate as members of 
Aboriginal communities separate from non-Aboriginal Canadians and the mainstream 
identity.207 Turpel, for example, believes AEDs "help dispel the impression that 
indigenous peoples are seeking assimilation into dominant institutions."208 Even for 
Aboriginal peoples who fully reject a Canadian identity, AEDs might make 
participation tolerable given such a serious psychological barrier. 
AEDs also encourage Aboriginal participation by minimizing the risk that 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples alike see participation as compromising their 
Ladner, "The Alienation of Nation," 24-25; and, Michael Murphy, "Representing Indigenous Self-
Determination," University of Toronto Law Journal 58 (2008): 212. 
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greater nationalist aims. Even at present, non-Aboriginal representatives may feel 
that they can speak for Aboriginal peoples even though many of their decisions ignore 
or go directly against Aboriginal interests. AEDs, instead, recognize the right of 
Aboriginal peoples to speak on their own behalf, giving them the opportunity to 
demonstrate to their constituents and the wider community their abilities, perspectives, 
and approaches when addressing key issues. Participation through AEDs should thus 
feel more secure from an Aboriginal perspective, allowing them, when necessary, to 
distance themselves from the decisions and views of non-Aboriginal representatives. 
It is also important to keep in mind that Aboriginal representation does not only 
promise to simply eliminate (or circumvent) barriers and risks associated with 
participation, but also to strengthen the symbolic aims of Aboriginal peoples. Many 
prominent Aboriginal scholars feel that guaranteed Aboriginal representation helps 
recognize and reinforce Aboriginal nationhood within Canadian institutions.210 AEDs 
can come to symbolize the permanent place of Aboriginal peoples alongside non-
Aboriginal Canadians in important legislative bodies. As Murphy suggests, they can 
"demonstrate to the public at large the legitimacy of a cooperative and bicultural 
approach to governance."211 AEDs run counter to the assimilationist trait of silencing 
and excluding Aboriginal peoples from participating in decisions affecting them. 
Aboriginal peoples deserve the same sense of belonging and respect that non-
209
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Aboriginal Canadians feel when participating in shared decision-making. AEDs 
should symbolically make it easier for Aboriginal peoples who do not (yet) feel a sense 
of solidarity or trust with the wider community to participate in shared institutions. 
The limited empirical evidence supports the idea that AEDs reduce 
psychological barriers to Aboriginal participation. Symbolic factors partly explain 
Maori support in New Zealand and indigenous support in Australia for guaranteed 
representation. The colonial history between European settlers and indigenous peoples 
in these two countries has led to similar situations of mistrust. Although most non-
Maori a century ago supported the seats because they were thought to marginalize the 
Maori and short-circuit their autonomist ambitions, some leaders felt AEDs play an 
important role in recognizing the Maori identity and of allowing them to participate as 
Maori in Parliament. James Fitzgerland, an MP in New Zealand's first parliament, 
wrote a colleague in 1865 that AEDs were a vital way of encouraging Maori, with their 
strong identities, to participate in parliament. Several chiefs agreed with him and 
pushed Parliament to introduce Maori seats.214 Today, many Maori still feel strongly 
that AEDs allow them to participate in Parliament without jeopardizing their unique 
identity.215 
Guaranteed Maori seats also symbolize the state's positive recognition of their 
distinct constitutional status. Despite their original intent, for many Maori AEDs now 
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highlight the permanent place of their unique rights and identities alongside the non-
Maori majority. In this regard, AEDs help keep Maori concerns at the forefront of 
public debate and remind New Zealanders of the importance of co-operation, mutual 
respect, and an inter-communal approach to governance. Scholars feel that the 
Maori value guaranteed representation because it allows them to speak for 
themselves.217 Maori representatives show the wider community that they can capably 
participate in, and determine, sound policies for themselves, their communities, and 
their country. As McLeay states, "through the provision of reserved seats in New 
Zealand, Maori have demonstrated their ability as legislators."218 It appears likely that 
even though Maori representatives have not always successfully defended Maori 
interests,219 their symbolic role has lead to significant Maori attachment to the 
continued existence of AEDs. 
Considering the significant degree of Aboriginal diversity discussed in Chapter 
One220 and the vastness of Canada's geography, critics suggest that some Aboriginal 
peoples would resist the homogenizing effect a limited number of AEDs would have on 
them. As Schouls argues, "Aboriginal claims to differentiated citizenship and the 
commitment of AEDs to the principle of electoral equality are in the end largely 
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incompatible objectives." Similarly, Ladner feels it is unjust to expect two or more 
Aboriginal (national or treaty) groups to participate within a single AED as it goes 
against Aboriginal traditions, identities, and wishes.222 Both correctly highlight the 
tension that exists between representative democracy and constituent diversity. 
Henderson, like Ladner, tries to overcome this challenge by proposing seats along 
treaty lines.223 However, this only shifts, and does not lessen, the tension.224 Many 
treaty groups themselves have significant internal diversity and divergent communities 
of interest. The populations falling under numbered treaties also greatly vary, some 
with small populations that struggle to justify an AED all for themselves.225 Their 
proposal also excludes many Aboriginal peoples, such as non-treaty and off-reserve 
populations. 
In my view, those who argue that we should reject AEDs unless they mirror 
Aboriginal diversity simply expect too much from Aboriginal representation and 
electoral politics in general. It is naive to suggest that Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
peoples alike should always expect their representatives to mirror their perspectives. 
Even non-Aboriginal representatives find themselves struggling to represent the many 
social, cultural, religious, gender, class, regional, and other identities and interests 
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within their constituency. Knight summarizes the converging views of prominent 
theorists like Kymlicka and Phillips when he says that we can only balance the need to 
represent all groups "with the knowledge that at some point mirror representation is 
impossible to achieve."226 Lastly, we should not forget that despite their diversity, 
Aboriginal peoples share many of the symbolic goals that AEDs advance such as 
overcoming our colonial past and respect for minority rights. Because common 
experiences and feelings of oppression and misunderstanding run through most 
Aboriginal communities, it seems safe to presume that Aboriginal peoples will find it 
easier to deal with their Aboriginal representative even if they do not come from the 
same community or background.227 Moreover, successful representatives generally 
champion issues affecting diverse cross-sections of their ridings, dealing with specific 
environmental concerns, an economic downturn affecting a certain sector or region, or 
assisting where an area's infrastructure lags behind other areas. The electoral success 
of Aboriginal representatives similarly depends in large part on their willingness to 
represent localized issues such as specific land claims, environmental degradation from 
industry, and specific communities lacking adequate water treatment infrastructure. 
The presence of Aboriginal representatives also helps to ensure that, through 
debate, legislation and policy consider Aboriginal interests. The ability of Aboriginal 
representatives to promote Aboriginal interests is vital because if AEDs fail to deliver 
results for Aboriginal peoples any initial enthusiasm will quickly wane as it did in the 
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years following their enfranchisement. I am not suggesting that support for 
guaranteed representation means that women must always represent women, workers 
must always represent workers, and so on (the principle of mirror representation). 
However, in majoritarian democracies there is always a risk that elected officials will 
fail to represent certain minorities within their constituencies. Unfortunately for 
Aboriginal peoples, the vast majority of Canadian politicians cannot expect to win 
elections by focusing on Aboriginal concerns. For instance, representatives probably 
find it difficult to raise controversial land settlement or treaty issues that go against the 
beliefs and interests of the non-Aboriginal majority within their constituency. The net 
effect has been that many Aboriginal peoples place little trust in the ability of Canadian 
institutions and non-Aboriginal representatives to promote their interests. In such cases 
the principle of mirror representation may be the only way to give an otherwise 
marginalized group a democratic voice within shared institutions.230 
Critics of guaranteed Aboriginal representation highlight important factors that 
threaten to undermine the ability of AEDs to promote Aboriginal interests. Two 
concerns related to interests are particularly worth discussing: first, that a small 
number of AEDs will have little or no impact on shared decisions; and second, that 
AEDs will allow non-Aboriginal representatives to ignore Aboriginal interests. Each 
of these criticisms raises important concerns. However, I am convinced that overall 
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AEDs empower Aboriginal peoples to pursue their interests and exercise self-
determination. This is particularly true when pursued in conjunction with other 
avenues such as self-government (discussed in earlier chapters) and co-management 
(discussed later in this chapter). We must tame our expectations, recognizing that 
increased Aboriginal participation in shared institutions will not give Aboriginal 
peoples veto powers when working with their non-Aboriginal neighbours, but bring 
greater balance to shared decision-making.231 
Beginning with the first concern, Georges Erasmus, long-standing Aboriginal 
leader and co-chair of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, expressed 
scepticism that even a dozen Aboriginal MPs would make an impact within the House 
of Commons.232 Several features of our parliamentary system limit the ability of 
Aboriginal representatives to promote Aboriginal interests. Walker, for example, 
summarizes why majority rule and party discipline have significantly limited Maori 
influence: "The Maori under the two party system is forever relegated to the position 
of outvoted minority. Maori cultural aspirations and desires for self-determination 
through affiliation to one or other of the major parties cannot be realized because both 
parties are dominated by pakehas [non-Maori]."233 Aboriginal representatives might 
promote Aboriginal interests within caucus or cabinet, but once a decision is made 
231
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behind closed doors everyone is expected to support the collective decision publicly 
even if it goes against Aboriginal interests. One prominent Maori MP stated that he 
constantly felt torn between his constituents' needs and party politics. Aboriginal 
representatives in Canada also face this challenge.235 Yet those who expect Aboriginal 
representatives, or any representatives, always to succeed in promoting their 
constituents' interests not only expect too much, but risk inverting the sense of 
alienation and mistrust as other Canadians may begin to see shared institutions as 
illegitimate.236 Instead, we should focus on the real possibility that the presence of 
even a few Aboriginal representatives might lead shared institutions to show greater 
respect and concern for Aboriginal interests.237 This fact is not lost on those who fight 
to keep their representation even when only a few seats are at stake.238 
The available empirical evidence supports the limited, yet important role 
Aboriginal representatives can play in shared institutions. Before the Second World 
War Maori representatives unsuccessfully fought to halt the government's efforts to 
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alienate their people from the land. While the presence of Maori representatives 
slowed the process for a short time, they eventually proved ineffectual as the state took 
the vast majority of Maori land out of Maori hands.239 In contrast, Maori MPs played a 
decisive role in establishing important social benefits for their people in the 1930s and 
convincing the government to recognize inherent Maori rights in the Treaty of Waitangi 
Act of 1975.240 More recently, New Zealand's Parliament has recognized Maori as an 
official language. Parliament has also recognized the need for increased Maori 
influence in decision-making, particularly on issues affecting the Maori people and 
their communities.241 Even in Canada, where Aboriginal representatives have been 
few, they have prompted significant change. Perhaps the most powerful impact was 
felt in 1990 when Elijah Harper, an Aboriginal Member of the Legislative Assembly 
(MLA) from Manitoba, played a key role in blocking the passage of the Meech Lake 
Accord.242 His actions reflected a general Aboriginal feeling that the Accord, which 
aimed to secure the Government of Quebec's constitutional consent by recognizing 
Quebec's status a distinct society, did not recognize inherent Aboriginal rights and was 
negotiated without Aboriginal participation. Almost immediately after the Accord's 
failure, Aboriginal peoples became full participants in further constitutional discussions 
including the discussions leading up to the failed 1992 referendum on the 
Charlottetown Accord.243 Harper's individual impact may have been an exception, yet 
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it serves as a reminder of the importance of securing an Aboriginal voice in every 
legislature. 
Certain Canadian political parties have also shown a willingness to include 
Aboriginal peoples within their organization and shared institutions more broadly. 
Both the Liberal Party and the New Democratic Party (NDP) have Aboriginal caucuses 
that promote Aboriginal inclusion at all party levels. In both cases, Aboriginal party 
members play an active role in developing party policy on issues of concern to 
Aboriginal peoples. The former played an important role in drafting the federal 
government's 1995 policy recognizing the inherent Aboriginal right to self-
government.244 In the latter case, Ujjal Dosanjh, as the NDP Premier of British 
Columbia, appointed Chief Ed John to cabinet in 2001 as Minister of Children and 
Families even though he was not a sitting MLA. Though he only served as Minister 
for a short six months, he had a lasting impact on his non-Aboriginal cabinet 
colleagues. Debating the merits of removing murals offensive to Aboriginal peoples in 
the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia over six years later (discussed at greater 
length in the next section), almost all NDP speakers who served in cabinet with John 
mentioned the decisive role he played in informing them of the issue's importance.245 
Critics - and even some supporters - also worry that AEDs will instil the notion 
that non-Aboriginal representatives only represent non-Aboriginal people, allowing 
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them to ignore Aboriginal interests without electoral consequences. The argument 
usually goes something like this: because AEDs remove Aboriginal constituents from 
traditional ridings, the vast majority of representatives will no longer respond to 
Aboriginal pressure and can instead refer Aboriginal peoples to their Aboriginal 
representative. A Royal Commission in New Zealand went so far as to recommend the 
abolition of Maori seats largely because of this concern, though the commission also 
supported a more proportional electoral system that they felt ensured Maori 
representatives would continue to be elected.247 On the surface, a reduced capacity to 
pressure an all-important majority of MPs should cause concern because Aboriginal 
issues might always be out-voted by non-Aboriginal MPs. I nevertheless support the 
view that AEDs can only improve Aboriginal influence.2 
For starters, sometimes resolving Aboriginal issues serves the public good or 
reflects common interests like having a clean environment, stability, and secure access 
to renewable resources.249 It is also possible that, if only out of self-interest, non-
Aboriginal Canadians will compel their representatives to address issues like the 
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terrible socio-economic conditions in many Aboriginal communities, which place a 
significant financial burden on our social and criminal justice systems. In other cases, 
non-Aboriginal representatives may feel compelled to support Aboriginal interests. 
Some may even empathize enough with Aboriginal concerns to lobby for change. As 
Henderson states, non-Aboriginal representatives are a diverse group of people with 
very different beliefs.250 
Critics also overstate the degree that representatives exclusively promote their 
constituents' interests. If Alberta's representatives always narrowly promoted 
Alberta's interests, and Ontario's representatives always narrowly promoted Ontario's 
interests, and so on, governments would find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
command the support needed to govern. Various features of representative 
democracy ensure representatives take a broader view of governance. For instance, the 
existence of political parties ensures that those who govern represent, in addition to 
their specific constituencies, a broad spectrum of different regional, ethno-cultural, 
national, and ideological interests. Prime Ministers normally appoint representatives 
from most Canadian regions into cabinet to reflect Canada's regional diversity. 
Opposition parties, too, promote the interests of constituencies where they lack 
representation because they realize that to form the government they need to win 
additional seats. Similarly, parties who run candidates in AEDs need to promote 
Aboriginal interests in their platforms to garner support in those ridings. Moreover, we 
should not underestimate the chance that one or more parties will sympathize with 
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Aboriginal aspirations, even sharing their frustration that most Canadians do not feel 
the same. Even Aboriginal representatives who sit as independents or form their own 
parties can vote en bloc to try to persuade governments to consider their interests. 
Voting en bloc could prove particularly effective when the issue concerns many 
Aboriginal peoples or in a minority government situation - a situation made more 
likely with the introduction of AEDs. Modifying the electoral system can also 
encourage non-Aboriginal representatives to compete for Aboriginal support. Fleras, 
for instance, suggests that it might prove helpful to give Aboriginal voters the right to 
vote in both Aboriginal and traditional electoral districts, though he realizes that 
Canadians would probably reject such a proposal.253 Even without overhauling the 
current electoral system, it is clear that traditional representatives take a wider view of 
governance than simply promoting the interests of those who directly vote for them. 
Yet, without introducing AEDs these benefits will not occur as the vast majority of 
traditional representatives can afford to ignore the interests of the relatively small 
Aboriginal population within each riding. By introducing AEDs, and concentrating 
Aboriginal peoples into a proportional number of guaranteed seats, Aboriginal peoples 
would collectively control seats within important legislative institutions, making 
Aboriginal interests more difficult to ignore for non-Aboriginal representatives and 
mainstream political parties. 
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To conclude, while AEDs promise to increase Aboriginal participation, I 
believe that it is also important to tame our expectations of AEDs not only by looking 
at them through the lens of representative democracy's limits, but also by 
understanding the need for broader reforms. As Fleras states, "AEDs are but one 
component in a comprehensive overhaul of Aboriginal-government relations. 
Introducing AEDs without comparable initiatives along a wide political, economic and 
social front may be interpreted as little more than a public relations exercise devoid of 
relevance to [Aboriginal peoples]." 5 It is important to find other ways of helping 
Aboriginal peoples feel comfortable participating in Canadian institutions so that they 
can take back some measure of control over their futures. The next two reforms, co-
management and indigenization, are suggested in this light. 
Reform #2: Co-management 
Co-management complements AEDs, particularly in Aboriginal communities that flatly 
refuse to participate in central legislatures or feel central legislatures cannot 
appropriately deal with their more specific and localized concerns. In 1975, the James 
Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA) between the Cree, the Inuit, the 
Government of Canada, and the Government of Quebec established the first of many 
co-management agreements across Canada that aimed to include Aboriginal peoples 
alongside the state in joint decision-making.255 Co-management exists predominantly 
in remote and northern parts of Canada and typically deals with resource and land 
254
 Fleras, "Aboriginal Electoral Districts for Canada," 93-94. 
255
 For an exceptional survey of the history, see Claudia Notzke, "A New Perspective in Aboriginal 
Natural Resource Management: Co-Management," Geoforum 26, no. 2 (1995): 187-209. 
97 
management issues. Beyond these two characteristics, it becomes more difficult to 
generalize. This section starts with an examination of the various types of co-
management agreements that exist. In particular, I study how and why co-management 
arrangements have been utilized to facilitate Aboriginal participation alongside the 
state. By studying these factors and keeping in mind the importance of symbolism and 
Aboriginal interests in building solidarity and trust, I suggest co-management 
complements other Aboriginal avenues for self-determination such as AEDs and self-
government. Examples are included whenever possible though every case's specific 
context goes beyond what this section can reasonably cover. Overall, I argue that co-
management can encourage meaningful Aboriginal participation in ways that 
acknowledge jurisdictional overlap and which strike a balance between Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal interests. 
Scholars use several typologies to describe and analyze co-management 
arrangements and the reasons for their implementation. Notzke identifies five reasons 
relating to comprehensive land claim settlements, crisis resolution, court decisions, 
national parks, and industrial development.256 Each of these classifications highlight 
different aspects and issues needing attention, though in practice they often interrelate -
e.g., issues involving national parks or land claims might lead to crises or involve court 
decisions. The last two describe how co-management applies to specific issues 
affecting Aboriginal peoples and their traditional areas. The first three categories, on 
the other hand, go beyond this in seeking to explain the positive effect co-management 
can have in addressing the overarching issue discussed in this thesis. That is, they 
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speak to the broader relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples, 
defining how we should interact at a much more general level. I do not mean to say 
that co-management of a certain development or park cannot offer positive and creative 
solutions. I do mean to say that it struggles to define governance of issues that quickly 
emerge beyond the scope of such agreements. Therefore, the former three categories 
become a much more meaningful focus herein. 
As an example of a comprehensive land claim involving co-management, the 
1998 Nisga'a Final Agreement between the Nisga'a, federal, and provincial 
governments established a Joint Fisheries Management Committee that ensures Nisga'a 
participation in managing the area's fish and wildlife.257 Resolving crises typically 
involves land claims or concerns over wildlife populations. Co-management can 
reduce tension in such situations, often acting as an interim measure until self-
government or other measures are in place. 58 A case involving the Algonquin and the 
Government of Ontario highlights this aspect. During the difficult process of resolving 
land claims both sides felt it necessary to establish hunting agreements that protect 
everyone's interests regarding moose and deer populations.259 Court decisions stress a 
broader need for co-management to resolve jurisdictional overlap in areas "not 
[necessarily] contingent upon a particular resource or event, but ... prompted by a 
fundamental rethinking of rights and relationships."260 Some feel the courts pressured 
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the Government of British Columbia to overturn its long-established policy against 
negotiating land claim agreements.261 As a result, British Columbia's government uses 
co-management as both an interim measure until treaties are ratified and to deal with 
overlapping resource claims. 
Co-management also varies in terms of Aboriginal participation and influence. 
Informed by Arnstein's 1969 article "A ladder of citizen participation," students of co-
management typically discuss various levels of integrating Aboriginal participation and 
influence with the state.262 Berkes, for instance, outlines seven levels of participation 
(from lowest to highest): informing, consultation, cooperation, communication, 
advisory committees, management boards, and partnership.263 Starting at one end of 
the scale, government simply informs local Aboriginal communities of rules, 
regulations, and changes resulting from state-level decisions. Consultation occurs 
when the state approaches Aboriginal peoples for input on policy, though it can easily 
be ignored. Examples of cooperation include Aboriginal peoples and the state working 
together on local research projects or the development of conservation materials for 
public use. Communication represents the first step in which Aboriginal concerns and 
perspectives are seriously considered, though ultimate decision-making still rests with 
the state.264 
Sherry Arnstein, "A ladder of citizen participation," American Institute of Planning Journal 35 
(1969): 216-224. 
Fikret Berkes, "Co-management: Bridging the Two Solitudes," Northern Perspectives 22, no. 2-3 
(1994): 19. Berkes also uses the highest level to describe community control, which in essence 
means local (Aboriginal) self-government. 
Fikret Berkes, Peter George, and Richard Preston, "Co-management: The Evolution of the Theory 
and Practice of Joint Administration of Living Resources," Alternatives 18, no. 2 (1991): 12-18. 
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Several scholars correctly feel that these first four levels inadequately include 
Aboriginal peoples in decision-making processes to address fundamental issues 
plaguing Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations. Arnstein classifies them as 
"manipulative," "non-participatory," and "degrees of tokenism."265 Roberts makes 
similar comments, arguing that the first four levels perpetuate conventional approaches 
to Aboriginal-state relations, thus further reducing the ability of Aboriginal peoples to 
influence decisions affecting them. As a result, she feels that only the highest three 
levels can effectively include Aboriginal peoples in shared decision-making, and thus 
be considered co-management.266 Tony Penikett, a former Yukon Premier and former 
deputy minister for negotiation in British Columbia, also dismisses these lower levels 
of co-management, supporting instead what he calls "co-jurisdiction," where all sides 
create "nation-to-nation protocols and institutions founded on government recognition 
of Aboriginal title, rather than its extinguishment."267 
Arnstein, Roberts, and Penikett all support higher levels of Aboriginal 
participation in co-management. Advisory committees and co-management boards, the 
fifth and sixth levels, both see Aboriginal and state representatives developing policy 
together, though co-management board decisions are more likely to be binding. 
Finally, full partnership describes situations where both sides have equal influence in 
shared decision-making institutions. Supporting the higher levels, the Inuit Tapirisat of 
Canada defines co-management as "the blending of [Inuit and state-level] systems of 
265
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management in such a way that the advantages of both are optimized, and the 
domination of one over the other is avoided."268 
Co-management can encourage meaningful Aboriginal participation in ways 
that acknowledge jurisdictional overlap only if Aboriginal peoples can successfully 
promote their values and interests. In such cases, co-management acts independently 
of Aboriginal and Canadian orders of government, though they remain constitutionally 
protected "institutions of public government."2 9 Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
governments independently appoint board members who work to resolve overlapping 
issues, managing shared jurisdictions as equal partners. 7 These factors allow co-
management boards to focus on mutual interests while at the same time protecting 
Aboriginal interests from being marginalized or ignored. They also complement some 
of the weaknesses of guaranteed Aboriginal representation. For starters, co-
management boards better reflect Aboriginal diversity. Unlike AEDs that typically 
combine Aboriginal communities of interest, co-management can better address the 
unique interests of individual Aboriginal communities. As previously discussed, 
Aboriginal electoral ridings will generally be quite large, covering dozens of different 
Aboriginal communities. Co-management, on the other hand, typically involves less 
than a few Aboriginal communities and often only one Aboriginal nation. Co-
management agreements go into detail on specific issues affecting specific Aboriginal 
Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, vol. 2. 
Graham White, "Treaty Federalism in Northern Canada: Aboriginal-Government Land Claims 
Boards," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 32, no. 3 (2002): 97-98. 
Notzke, "A New Perspective," 188; and, White, "And Now For Something Completely Northern," 
90-93. 
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communities, whereas Aboriginal representatives would have limited time or energy to 
pursue such a focus on a regular basis. 
Second, unlike the experiences of Aboriginal representatives within many 
central institutions, co-management's emphasis on the importance of consensus is of 
great symbolic and practical value for many Aboriginal peoples. Consensus serves 
Aboriginal interests by giving them a real opportunity to voice their concerns on issues 
affecting them and their communities. Though some may feel that because ministers 
can technically override co-management decisions the entire aim of the project is 
undermined, in practice ministers only do so on very rare occasions.271 More 
importantly, the idea of an override should not trouble us if it is used sparingly and 
Aboriginal peoples can challenge ministerial decisions through avenues such as the 
courts or other conflict resolution procedures.272 These avenues become equally 
necessary when Canadian governments choose to circumvent or ignore co-management 
decisions. Promoting relationships where no side constantly dominates the other, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, requires checks and balances so all parties influence joint 
decisions. A significant check used in Canada's territories is the "negative option" 
ministers have in dealing with co-management decisions: 
1
 White, "Treaty Federalism in Northern Canada," 100; White, "And Now For Something Completely 
Northern," 92; and, David C. Natcher, Susan Davis, and Clifford G Hickey, "Co-Management: 
Managing Relationships, Not Resources," Human Organization 64, no. 3 (2005): 241-242; 
2
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promotes mediation and arbitration that commences with time lines that are much quicker than the 
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Unless [ministers] formally overturn board decisions within a specified 
time period, the decision stands. This effectively reverses the political 
onus: rather than the boards expending political capital to convince 
government to accept their decisions, government faces political 
difficulty should it wish to veto a board recommendation. And indeed, 
fewer than a handful of important board decisions have been 
overturned. 
Overall, scholars who study a range of co-management agreements feel that they can 
significantly improve Aboriginal influence over shared jurisdictions. 7 Though an 
Aboriginal veto rarely exists, co-management still gives them considerable, if not 
equal, influence in local affairs that complements the function of AEDs. 
Co-management also addresses many of self-government's deficiencies 
discussed in earlier chapters because it reflects interdependence and the complex 
relationship Aboriginal peoples have with non-Aboriginal Canadians. First, co-
management better addresses the limited capacity of Aboriginal communities. 
Although self-government agreements also typically involve federal assistance, co-
management agreements often require federal, provincial, and territorial governments 
to implement and enforce board decisions, thus alleviating Aboriginal peoples from 
expending considerable energy in these areas.275 Co-management frees up limited 
Aboriginal resources to pursue other avenues that promote self-determination. Second, 
co-management may be of assistance in resolving disputes such as the one raised by 
Ladner around the traditional Mi'kmaq fishery and discussed at greater length in the 
first chapter. If the Mi'kmaq and non-Aboriginal communities both continue to seek 
White, "And Now For Something Completely Northern," 92. See, also, White, "Treaty Federalism in 
Northern Canada," 108-110. 
For many good examples, see Notzke, "A New Perspective," 187-209; and, White, "Treaty 
Federalism in Northern Canada," 89-114. 
White, "Treaty Federalism in Northern Canada," 89-114. 
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exclusive jurisdiction over the salmon fishery boats will continue to burn and fish 
stocks may dwindle as each side assumes the worst of the other. Co-management of 
the fishery between the Haida Gwaii and non-Aboriginal communities on the Queen 
Charlotte Islands seems to have taken precisely this more constructive route. As 
Richardson and Green state: 
Our relationship to the resources of Haida Gwaii cannot be managed 
by governments of another culture, with a different set of values. This 
is perhaps the most important reason for co-management—to provide 
a means for different cultures with conflicting values to share in a 
resource. Management of fisheries resources by one culture results in 
the almost complete loss of the ability of the resources to provide for 
the values of another culture.276 
Richardson and Green acknowledge our interdependence and the need for, and strong 
benefits of, working together and respecting one another. 
Finally, it seems more likely that non-Aboriginal Canadians would accept co-
management than self-government, particularly in urban areas where Aboriginal self-
government as autonomy is simply out of the question. Whereas Aboriginal self-
government works to create a space that excludes non-Aboriginal Canadians, co-
management aims to reconcile Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests where mutual 
exclusion cannot easily occur. These last two reasons in particular highlight how we 
can extend co-management to urban areas where interdependence is unavoidable. In 
urban areas, education and health care issues tend to be more salient than wildlife and 
land management issues. Urban co-management arrangements could secure Aboriginal 
Miles Richardson and Bill Green, "The Fisheries Co-management Initiative in Haida Gwaii," in Co-
operative Management of Local Fisheries, ed. Evelyn Pinkerton (Vancouver, British Columbia: 
UBC Press, 1989), 259. Penikett reinforces this view in a more recent book {Reconciliation, 272 
recommendation no. 6 and 10), though he shows that when British Columbia's governing party 
changed in 2001 the relationship soured somewhat {Reconciliation, 212-217). 
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involvement on local government boards, health boards, and education boards. To take 
it even further, it seems reasonable that Aboriginal peoples would also have a say on 
many local government committees that report to these governing bodies. Co-
management encourages all levels of government to judge the success of their decisions 
by the extent to which both sides can effectively participate and see their interests 
integrated and respected.277 Moreover, when Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples 
make decisions collectively, it seems only logical that they would support them 
collectively. 
Though co-management faces many of the same challenges as self-government 
in terms of obtaining non-Aboriginal political and financial support, and bridging the 
gap in understanding between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples, it seems more 
likely to receive serious support in situations of complex interdependence. Non-
Aboriginal Canadians will generally find co-management more agreeable than self-
government because co-management tends to place greater emphasis on common goals 
and shared authority. It provides another avenue (supplementing or substituting AEDs) 
to discuss significant concerns instead of rejecting cooperation and seeking unrealistic 
degrees of autonomy. 
Yet, because it is local in scope, co-management seems incapable of resolving 
large-scale conflict. Co-management cannot replace the need for some form of 
Aboriginal representation in central institutions that determine policy on national issues 
including immigration, health care, the environment, and broader economic policy. 
This does not mean that the two levels do not interrelate. We should not underestimate 
277
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the possibility that positive developments at the local level might lead to greater 
participation at other levels as feelings of trust and solidarity slowly build. Overall, co-
management can mitigate the state's influence in Aboriginal affairs and promote more 
positive, balanced relationships between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples. It 
therefore represents a positive step away from a past where progress by one group 
entailed resistance by another. Given its relatively short history only time and the 
imaginations of leaders on all sides will tell how far co-management can go to restore a 
measure of self-determination for Aboriginal peoples both on- and off-reserve, and in 
both rural and urban areas. 
Reform #3: Indigenizing Shared Institutions 
Some argue that participating in shared institutions still legitimizes colonial styles of 
governance. Many Aboriginal people feel Aboriginal representatives are "sell-outs" 
who work against the wishes and interests of their people.278 As the following 
examples show, indigenization beyond simply establishing AEDs or co-management 
boards may help such Aboriginal people positively identify with shared institutions. 
Indigenization is largely about making changes so that Aboriginal peoples see their 
traditions, values, and cultures represented and respected within publicly shared 
institutions. Indigenization helps many of those with strong Aboriginal identities feel 
more comfortable within shared institutions.279 Indigenization can take many forms. 
278
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279
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Instead of theorizing about the full range of possibilities, I draw on three particular 
examples - from Canada's territories, New Zealand, and British Columbia - that 
highlight its potential for encouraging Aboriginal participation. 
In studying Canada's territories, Graham White suggests our parliamentary 
system is perhaps more flexible than many believe. He shows particular interest in 
how the Northwest Territories and Nunavut promote consensus government alongside 
the Westminster model in what he calls "a non-partisan Westminster cabinet-
parliamentary regime."280 Although the lack of political parties represents a significant 
difference that many Canadians likely would resist, it promotes key aspects of 
Aboriginal governance while simultaneously preserving most characteristics of the 
Westminster model. White believes the ability to hybridize our shared institutions is an 
important factor in explaining the high levels of Aboriginal participation in shared 
territorial institutions. For instance, he suggests Inuit participation in Nunavut's 
institutions does not stem solely from their numerical dominance, but also from "a 
government operating according to Inuit norms and culture."281 How we can replicate 
lessons from Canada's Arctic elsewhere in the country remains an open question. 
Blattberg, for instance, suggests at the end of a largely theoretical work that improving 
inter-communal trust could be facilitated by something as simple as changing the 
layout of Canadian legislatures from two parallel sides to a circular arrangement.282 
Benefits might also come from modifying the decoration typically found in shared 
280
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institutions, or creating a special question period dedicated to Aboriginal issues. At 
minimum, White's research shows that effective symbolic reform need not entail 
radical institutional transformation. 
In New Zealand, the past decade has seen Members of Parliament regularly 
promote the use of Maori language, the incorporation of traditional cultural customs 
and protocols (tikanga) in legal and political forums, and the performance of traditional 
songs (waiata) during debates. As an example of the latter, on August 22, 2006, Maori 
MP Pita Paraone sang a traditional song to mourn the recent loss of the Maori 
Queen.283 Members of Parliament also express themselves through waiata when 
celebrating Maori achievements. For instance, just before the Ngdti Mutunga Claims 
Settlement Bill (2006) passed final reading, Maori minister Mahara Okeroa sang a 
waiata that suggested the Bill helped overcome past injustices and illustrated the need 
for Maori and non-Maori peoples to work together.284 Another interesting 
development is the ability of Maori members of the public to ask questions of 
Parliament from the public gallery. These reforms signal to the Maori that participation 
in shared institutions can coexist with, and even reinforce, their national identity.285 
Similar efforts in Canada also go a long way in this regard. In 2000, Aboriginal 
leaders informed the government of the offensive nature of four murals found in the 
Legislative Assembly of British Columbia's prominent lower rotunda. The letter stated 
that "these paintings of bare-breasted Aboriginal women and of Aboriginal people in 
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subservient positions are... highly offensive, demeaning and degrading to First Nations 
people in the province."286 In response, the Speaker appointed a five-person 
independent panel to examine the issue. The panel recommended the removal and 
relocation of the murals.287 In April 2007, the Legislature passed a motion supporting 
the report's recommendation. Legislative debate and Aboriginal responses highlight 
the moment's symbolic importance. Considering the psychological barrier posed by 
the murals, the Premier stated that 
if literally tens of thousands of British Columbians feel insulted and 
hurt by the depictions [we must remove them].... We want this place 
to be inclusive. We want First Nations to be comfortable. We want 
young First Nations kids who walk into that rotunda to say to 
themselves: 'Some day that could be my place. Some day I could sit 
in that chamber. I am not someone who is apart.'288 
Representatives from both political parties echoed the premier's view. One opposition 
member even linked the present lack of Aboriginal Members of the Legislative 
Assembly to the symbolic barriers present throughout the current system of 
governance.289 He suggested that the presence of offensive symbols within the 
legislature represents a significant psychological barrier that likely plays a part in 
explaining the lack of Aboriginal representatives among its seventy-nine members. 
Members of both parties clearly recognized the need for Aboriginal peoples to 
feel that the legislature reflects their values and interests in a way that conveys a sense 
of self-respect. Provincial Aboriginal leaders welcomed the decision, stating that it 
Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, A Review of the Depicting of Aboriginal Peoples in the 
Artworks of the Parliament Buildings: Report of the Speaker's Advisory Panel (Victoria, British 
Columbia: 2001), 7. 
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represented a positive step towards resolving their issues within shared institutions and 
with non-Aboriginal Canadians.290 One can well imagine that until now many 
Aboriginal peoples considered Aboriginal representatives as "sell-outs" for walking 
past those murals to assume their seats. Indigenizing shared institutions by removing 
cultural barriers and positively promoting Aboriginal cultures gives Aboriginal peoples 
signs of goodwill that instill a sense of belonging within shared institutions and that 
make them feel that their direct participation in public institutions and public life is 
valued. Ultimately, indigenization can help build inter-communal trust and lessen 
Aboriginal feelings of alienation. 
Conclusion 
Aboriginal electoral districts, indigenization, and co-management offer three avenues 
for improving Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations given complex interdependence and 
the resulting need for both sides to participate in decisions that affect them. AEDs 
secure a place for Aboriginal peoples in state institutions that can have a substantial 
impact on the lives of Aboriginal peoples from all nations living in all parts of Canada. 
Yet, they do not give Aboriginal peoples a veto. They will nevertheless sometimes be 
able to deliver important results. As shown by the example of Elijah Harper playing a 
key role in stopping the Meech Lake Accord, a single Aboriginal representative can 
have a significant impact. At other times, Aboriginal representatives may find 
290
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themselves outvoted and ignored. Indigenization also restores a measure of balance to 
public institutions by giving Aboriginal traditions and values a place alongside those 
currently promoted and practiced within shared institutions. Addressing symbolic 
concerns is important if we want more Aboriginal peoples to feel comfortable in 
institutions that once sought to extinguish their inherent rights. Indigenization tells 
Aboriginal peoples that, like non-Aboriginal Canadians, they do not have to check their 
national identity at the door when entering shared institutions or speaking to matters 
that affect their community or all Canadians. Instead, it promotes the inclusion of their 
languages, cultures, traditions and values alongside those of non-Aboriginal peoples 
when performing these important public functions. 
Co-management also promotes a balance between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal values and interests. In many instances, it helps to resolve situations where 
both sides simply ignore each other or, worse, actively destroy the other's ability to use 
shared resources to meet their cultural or economic needs. The ability to bring both 
sides together to move beyond simply self-interest is precisely why Richardson and 
Green support co-management of the west coast fishery. However, as in the case of 
AEDs, Aboriginal peoples, and non-Aboriginal Canadians, should not expect an 
ironclad guarantee that their interests will prevail in every case - something that makes 
achieving solidarity and trust more difficult for one side or the other. The idea of a 
minister being able to override co-management decisions can actually be healthy if 
mechanisms exist for Aboriginal peoples to challenge such decisions. Without checks 
and balances, co-management would struggle for legitimacy as both sides choose to use 
their energy in ways that are more confrontational. 
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All three reforms present us with complementary ways of encouraging 
Aboriginal participation in shared institutions alongside non-Aboriginal Canadians by 
addressing their symbolic concerns and acknowledging their interests. They are not 
likely to achieve a perfect balance between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests, 
nor do they exhaust the possible avenues Aboriginal peoples can use to achieve self-
determination and positively influence their individual and collective futures. These 
reforms nevertheless promote a more just balance of power and, if implemented 
sincerely, can show goodwill towards Aboriginal peoples that can build solidarity and 
trust. In this way, we might at last overcome feelings of alienation in many Aboriginal 
communities and might even see a sense of solidarity emerge. 
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Conclusion 
Our unavoidable interdependence and the profound sense of alienation and mistrust 
many Aboriginal peoples feel towards Canadian institutions represent significant 
factors that we must consider as we work towards establishing a post-colonial order. 
Our unavoidable interdependence ensures that for most, if not all, Aboriginal peoples 
self-determination simply understood as autonomy has serious limits. Though 
Kymlicka primarily discusses and recommends autonomy in situations where multiple 
nations coexist within a single state, Aboriginal nations face significant empirical 
challenges related to small community size, diverse backgrounds, and geographic 
dispersion that undermine their ability to govern autonomously of the Canadian state. 
Thus, to exercise self-determination on par with other nations, Aboriginal peoples must 
participate in shared institutions that fundamentally and invariably affect their lives and 
the future of their communities. 
This reality challenges Aboriginal peoples' feelings on the subject. The 
profound sense of alienation and mistrust many Aboriginal peoples feel towards the 
state makes participation difficult from their perspective. I have cited many reasons for 
this resistance towards participation. Past behaviour within Canadian institutions has 
led many Aboriginal peoples to feel that our shared institutions symbolize their 
marginalization and oppression. Canadian history is full of examples where non-
Aboriginal people made important decisions without consulting Aboriginal peoples, 
often promoting assimilationist policies aimed at destroying Aboriginal cultures and 
extinguishing Aboriginal rights. Even today with the right to vote and special status 
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under the constitution, Aboriginal peoples find it difficult to influence and inform 
debate within our shared institutions. Shared institutions thus cater to the non-
Aboriginal majority and do little to promote Aboriginal interests. Other Aboriginal 
peoples simply do not feel that they belong in Canadian institutions, feeling that 
participation in those institutions conflicts with their strongly held Aboriginal 
identities. Yet, despite these views, decisions made in Canadian institutions affect all 
Aboriginal peoples to some degree. 
These aspects of Canadian Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations help define the 
fundamental question I have tackled in this thesis: how do we empower Aboriginal 
peoples within shared institutions and encourage them to see participation in shared 
institutions as positive for their communities and expressive of their desire to self-
determine given that our futures are intimately connected? My answer to this question 
suggests that increasing Aboriginal participation and effectiveness in shared institutions 
requires a theory of citizenship that does not demand that Aboriginal peoples adopt a 
shared identity or simply participate without sharing anything with non-Aboriginal 
Canadians. Instead, we must encourage all Canadians to share a sense of identification 
with shared institutions that makes participation feel more natural and expressive 
particularly for marginalized minorities such as Aboriginal peoples. This might be 
accomplished in a variety of ways. For example, I have suggested that incorporating 
Aboriginal cultures into the daily events of shared institutions helps in this regard. In 
addition, the introduction of AEDs allows Aboriginal peoples to see themselves as 
represented within shared institutions even if they do not agree with its decisions or the 
views of non-Aboriginal representatives. Through such initiatives, it might even be 
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possible to reverse the sense of alienation and mistrust many Aboriginal people feel 
towards shared institutions should we promote reforms that lead to increased 
Aboriginal participation rates and real results for Aboriginal peoples. In other words, 
we require changes that Aboriginal peoples can accept and that allow them to affect 
shared decision-making to the extent that shared institutions affect them and their 
communities. I believe the reforms discussed in Chapter Three - AEDs, co-
management, and indigenizing shared institutions - represent possible change in this 
direction. 
Reforms such as those discussed in Chapter Three seek to bridge the 
psychological divide between Aboriginal peoples, non-Aboriginal Canadians, and 
shared institutions in two fundamental ways. First, the reforms speak to the need to 
affirm and recognize Aboriginal difference within public life. Symbolic reforms in 
particular fall under this category. Indigenizing shared institutions, for instance, sends 
a strong message to Aboriginal peoples that they are accepted for who they are and that 
their cultures and perspectives rightfully coexist alongside those of the majority. 
Second, symbolic reforms allow Aboriginal peoples to participate effectively in shared 
institutions, avoiding changes that are merely tokenistic. Both Aboriginal Electoral 
Districts and co-management arrangements give Aboriginal peoples some measure of 
control over decisions that affect them, and thus offer the possibility of encouraging 
Aboriginal participation, lessening mistrust, and possibly even building solidarity. 
They can bring greater balance to decision-making if introduced with the right intent 
and with strong consideration for the sentiments of Aboriginal peoples. 
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Even with the aforementioned reforms, participation in shared Canadian 
institutions still has significant risks, limits, and challenges. Non-Aboriginal 
dominance in shared legislatures might still drown out Aboriginal voices, although 
introducing guaranteed Aboriginal representatives should make this more difficult. 
Ministers can still override the decisions made by even the most consensual of co-
management boards. This might lead to lengthy legal battles that could undermine 
efforts to foster positive relationships - relationships that such boards must seek to 
establish. AEDs and indigenization also struggle to represent Aboriginal diversity in 
an effective way, with some arguing that such initiatives have a strong homogenizing 
effect on many national communities. This limit seems difficult to overcome, and in 
the case of AEDs I have suggested that we cannot expect representatives to mirror the 
full diversity of their constituents. Nevertheless, I have shown why I feel that AEDs 
can pressure Aboriginal representatives, political parties, and Canadian institutions to 
respond to diverse Aboriginal interests and identities. As regards indigenization in 
shared public institutions, we must eradicate those symbols of our colonial history that 
Aboriginal peoples find offensive or alienating. We must also work toward making our 
shared institutions places where Aboriginal languages and cultures are accepted and 
reflected. These types of reforms will not always be easy but we must pursue them if 
we wish to empower Aboriginal peoples so that they can tackle the many challenges 
they face. 
Finally, the most significant challenge seems to be the significant time and 
energy needed to pursue Aboriginal self-determination through participating in shared 
institutions. Aboriginal peoples rightfully seek greater self-government and control 
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over their own local affairs and priorities. To pursue many political initiatives at once 
places a great deal of strain on the limited capacity that exists in most Aboriginal 
communities. Yet, despite these significant risks and limitations, I feel that the reforms 
proposed in this thesis can contribute to improved relations among Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal peoples in Canada. They can do so by making our political institutions 
more inclusive and by affording Aboriginal peoples the means to participate more 
effectively in all decisions that affect them and their communities. It is of course up to 
Aboriginal peoples themselves to judge whether the risk of such participation is too 
great, or the cost too high. However, I feel that my proposals promise to decrease the 
costs to Aboriginal peoples of participating in shared institutions, while increasing the 
impact of their involvement. For these reasons, my proposed reforms promise to move 
us closer to relationships founded upon balanced decision-making and equality. 
Overall, we must be careful to ensure that we promote the symbolic and 
practical benefits as much as possible while avoiding anything that sustains or deepens 
Aboriginal feelings of alienation and mistrust. While Cairns speaks to the important 
benefits of recognizing Aboriginal difference and addressing our colonial past, his 
insistence on a shared identity risks pushing away the very people his theory aims to 
include. Aboriginal peoples rightly approach new ideas with a great deal of scepticism 
given the historical reality. There is thus no guarantee that the reforms I have 
recommended will work for all Aboriginal individuals or communities. Many may 
continue to seek only autonomy, knowing its serious limits and tacitly allowing 
Canadian governments to continue to make decisions affecting their peoples without 
their direct involvement. Yet, such a sacrifice should be unnecessary and appears to be 
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avoidable. From indigenizing shared institutions to guaranteeing Aboriginal peoples a 
voice in Canadian legislatures and at co-management tables, solutions exist that can 
address our interdependence and respect the strongly (and sometimes exclusively) held 
Aboriginal identities of many Aboriginal peoples. Finding a balance between, on the 
one hand, reforming Canadian institutions and, on the other hand, encouraging 
Aboriginal participation and feelings of solidarity is not easy. My hope is that I have 
shown that this is not impossible to achieve. 
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